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1. Introduction 
The agri-food sector is witnessing increased moves towards closer vertical 
coordination in a drive to tackle market transaction costs. The key factors affecting the 
type and degree of vertical coordination in the food supply chain include asset 
specificity and the hold-up problem, uncertainty and asymmetric information. In 
addition, increasing consumer demand for food quality and diversity (e.g. animal 
welfare, food safety, traceability, quality standards and environmental concerns) has 
been pivotal in increasing vertical coordination among different actors in the food 
supply chain (see, for example, Reardon et al., 2003; Reardon and Swinnen, 2004; 
Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Reardon and Barrett, 2000). 
However, the actual impact of vertical coordination on the farming sector is still not 
fully understood and is subject to ongoing debate. Indeed, it is often argued that 
vertical coordination in the supply chain can enable farmers to reduce the risks 
associated with demand uncertainty and price fluctuations, and to have better access 
to credit and technology, as well as reducing transaction costs associated with 
accessing markets and leading to more efficient exchange of information and adoption 
of innovative organizational structures. On the other hand, the growth of vertically 
integrated markets in the food supply chain provides an opportunity for dominant 
firms to impose their influence on weaker players such as farmers (see, for example, 
Key and Runsten, 1999; Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 2002; Gow, Streeter and 
Swinnen 2000; Swinnen, Beerlandt and Dries, 2003; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
Indeed, in the past few decades it has been observed that the increasing vertical 
coordination in the food supply chain has been accompanied by concentration in the 
input supply, processing and retail sectors. Market power may put farmers at a 
disadvantage when negotiating over price and contractual relations (see, for example, 
McCorriston, 2002; Sexton, 2000; Sexton, 2013; Bonanno, Russo and Menapace, 
2018). Overall, the bargaining power of downstream and upstream industries makes 
farmers vulnerable to unfair trading practices (UTPs) in their contractual relations with 
input providers and output buyers (Fałkowski et al., 2017). 
The imbalance in bargaining power between trading parties is one of the principal 
causes of UTPs. However, other factors can lead to an increase in UTPs, such as the 
switching costs involved in changing trading party, asymmetric information, 
incompleteness of contracts and the asymmetric costs of contract enforcement (e.g. in 
accessing justice). Each of these elements can lead to a different UTP, such as one-
sided clauses in contracts, unilateral changes in contract terms, late payments or ad 
hoc changes to contract terms (Gow, Streeter and Swinnen, 2000; Renda et al., 2014; 
Fałkowski et al., 2017; Sexton, 2017a,b). 
Unfair trading practices have recently come under intense policy scrutiny (European 
Commission (2013b, 2014a,b). In 2013, the European Commission adopted the 
European Retail Action Plan and a Green Paper on unfair trading practices in the 
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business-to-business food and non-food supply chains (European Commission, 
2013a). The weak position of farmers in the food supply chain was highlighted in the 
State of the Union addresses of 2015 and 2016 (European Commission, 2015, 2016a). 
In June 2016, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on UTPs and requested 
that the European Commission assess the possibilities for policy action to address 
UTPs (European Parliament, 2016). In December 2016, the Council of Ministers called 
on the Commission to undertake an impact assessment with a view to proposing an 
EU legislative framework or other, non-legislative, measures in the area of UTPs 
(European Council, 2016b). As a response to these calls, in 2018 the European 
Commission published an impact assessment and a proposal for a directive on unfair 
trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the food supply chain 
(European Commission, 2017, 2018). 
In parallel with this political interest, there is a growing body of scientific literature 
that directly or indirectly deals with the concept of UTPs. The empirical literature that 
recognises (implicitly or explicitly) the multidimensionality of UTPs is rather scarce 
(see, for example, Copa-Cogeca, 2013a, 2013b; Basic, 2015). On the other hand, 
there is a relatively large empirical literature that deals with one or selected forms of 
UTPs. This includes studies on market distortions caused by market power (Digal and 
Ahmadi-Esfahani, 2002; MacDonald and Key, 2012; Fałkowski and Ciaian, 2016; 
Perekhozhuk et al., 2016), price transmission (Vavra and Goodwin, 2005; Assefa, 
Kuiper and Meuwissen, 2014; Goetz, Taubadel and Kachel, 2008) and contracting and 
vertical integration (Katchova, 2013; Assefa et al., 2014, Otsuka, Nakano and 
Takahashi, 2016; Potts, Fernandez and Wunderlich, 2007). UTPs are not necessarily 
the primary focus of these studies. The same holds for the theoretical literature, 
although more theoretical studies are available that analyse the potential causes and 
impacts of UTPs. This literature finds that UTPs may have various adverse impacts on 
the functioning of EU food supply chains, potentially affecting income distribution 
among active agents, structural change in EU farming, food quality and food 
availability, and rural employment (Gow and Swinnen, 2000; Renda et al., 2014; 
Fałkowski et al., 2017). 
The dairy sector is the subject of intense policy attention in the EU. The European 
Parliament and the Council have adopted a series of regulations (referred to as the 
Milk Package) establishing the policy framework for the dairy sector in EU. The 
objective of the Milk Package was to strengthen the position of dairy producers in the 
dairy supply chain and to prepare the sector to operate in a more market-driven 
environment. Among other things, it offers Member States (MS) the possibility to 
make written contracts between farmers and processors compulsory in the milk 
sector, and it allows farmers to negotiate contract terms collectively through producer 
organizations (EU, 2012a, 2012b, 2013). The dairy sector is particularly susceptible to 
UTPs because of the specific nature of the on-farm investments that a dairy operation 
requires, as well as the perishability and seasonality of milk. 
This report attempts to shed some light on this topic by examining the incidence of 
UTPs in the dairy supply chain. This study is particularly relevant because it considers 
various forms of UTPs occurring at farm level. The literature analysing the incidence of 
UTPs at farm level is less abundant than that covering other segments of the food 
supply chain, particularly consumers (Dries, 2017; Fałkowski et al., 2017; Russo, 
Sorrentino and Menapace, 2017). By accounting for different types of UTPs, the study 
evaluates the presence and size of UTPs at different stages in farmers’ contractual 
relationships with buyers. Note that this report focuses on UTPs reported by dairy 
farmers and does not cover other segments of the dairy supply chain. The analysis is 
based on a survey conducted among dairy farms in five selected EU regions located in 
four EU MS (France, Germany, Poland and Spain). The dairy farm survey data were 
collected through face-to-face interviews in 2017 and comprise 1248 observations. 
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2. Review of literature on the incidence of trading 
practices that are unfair to farmers 
2.1. Conceptual literature 
Food supply chains have become increasingly complex in recent decades. The 
organization and structure of food supply chains are characterized by complex 
interactions with increased vertical coordination usually achieved through contracting 
in agricultural markets (Ménard, 1996; Ménard and Valceschini, 2005; Vavra, 2009; 
MacDonald and Korp, 2011; Bonanno, Russo and Menapace, 2018). The key factors 
affecting the type and degree of vertical coordination in the food supply chain include 
asset specificity, the hold-up problem and behavioural uncertainty due to asymmetric 
information and transaction costs. 
In parallel with the rise of vertical coordination, food supply chains have witnessed 
increased moves towards concentration in the input supply, processing and retail 
sectors (McCorriston, 2002; Sexton, 2000; Sexton, 2013). The growth of imbalances 
in market power, combined with the vertically integrated markets in food supply 
chains, provides an opportunity for players with power to impose their influence on 
weaker players (e.g. small suppliers). While market power is perceived to be the main 
cause of UTPs, there are other factors that create situations in which firms might 
abuse their position and use UTPs. Renda et al. (2014) identify further factors as main 
causes of UTPs, namely (i) imbalances in the bargaining power of firms, (ii) switching 
costs, (iii) asymmetric information, (iv) costs of contract enforcement, (v) perishability 
of goods and seasonality of production and (vi) transaction costs (Gow, Streeter and 
Swinnen, 2000; Renda et al., 2014; Fałkowski et al., 2017; Gorton, Lemke and Alfarsi, 
2017). 
Imbalances in bargaining power have been identified as one of the main causes of 
UTPs. When there are imbalances in bargaining power, firms with more power can 
affect contractual terms to their advantage. In this context, we use “bargaining 
power” to mean the ability to influence the behaviour of other firms, which could 
include price/quantity distortions – in the traditional market power sense – or other 
non-price/quantity distortions encompassing any aspect of transactions taking place in 
the chain (Bonanno, Russo and Menapace, 2018).
1
 It mainly refers to unequal capacity 
to influence partners. In the context of a contractual relationship, this might generate 
different types of UTP, such as unequal contract terms, supply constraints imposed on 
farmers by the processor, or unilateral retroactive changes in contract and/or trade 
terms. This idea has been challenged by Sexton (2017a, 2017b), who argues against 
the idea that UTPs are more likely to occur in concentrated food supply chains, instead 
showing that, under certain market conditions, increasing concentration results in 
more efficient market outcomes and better conditions for farmers than in less 
concentrated food supply chains. In his view, the higher the concentration level, the 
better the position buyers (e.g. processors) are in to internalize the benefits of a 
steady supply from farmers (Mérel and Sexton, 2017). However, in the light of the 
transaction costs associated with contracting, smaller farmers will be vulnerable to 
UTPs when entering into long-term contractual relationships with large buyers. For 
example, although large buyers may provide farmers with incentive schemes to 
produce at optimal efficiency, they may also extract quasi-rents from farmers by 
imposing various trading practices (e.g. two-part tariffs, territorial supply constraints, 
                                           
1 According to Bonanno, Russo and Menapace (2018), the main difference between market power and 
bargaining power is that, under the former, price distortions occur because the strong firm alters the 
quantity traded on the market (i.e. it purchases/supplies less). In a bargaining power context, the strong 
firm uses a threat to achieve its objectives. Bargaining power might not necessarily result in price/quantity 
distortions. Firms might employ the most efficient contractual arrangement while using bargaining power to 
alter the terms to their benefit (including using UTPs) (Muthoo, 1999; Bonanno, Russo and Menapace, 
2018). 
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retroactive charges) that have, among other effects, income distributional effects 
(Bonanno, Russo and Menapace, 2018). Similarly, an imbalance of bargaining power 
can be caused indirectly by a lack of alternative trading partners, which might make 
suppliers dependent on one specific buyer who sets the rules.  
Costs associated with switching trading party are another reason why UTPs can arise. 
It is argued that these costs might be a barrier to exiting a particular commercial 
relationship. A common situation when switching costs can occur when there is a 
relationship (contract)-specific investment. When a firm invests in assets or skills (e.g. 
technology, know-how) specific to a particular commercial relationship that are less 
valuable in other settings (e.g. with an alternative trading partner), it becomes 
vulnerable and exposes itself to potential misuse (to UTPs) by its trading partner. 
Positive switching costs reduce the likelihood of switching trading party, which gives a 
rational trading counter-party the chance to alter the contractual terms in its favour. 
That is, the requirement to invest in (contract)-specific assets leads to the so-called 
hold-up problem, whereby a buyer can exploit ex-post the fact that farm product 
supply is inelastic in the short term (reinforced by the perishability of farm products), 
and makes it costly to switch buyers because of the sunk costs of the specific asset. 
Hold-up can be defined as “the general business problem in which each party to a 
contract worries about being forced to accept disadvantageous terms later, after it has 
sunk an investment, or worries that its investment may be devalued by others” 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, p. 136). This is exacerbated by the fact that  contracts in 
the agri-food sector are usually shorter than the life-span of farmers’ specialized sunk 
assets required by buyers. The contractual arrangements that might signal less use of 
UTPs by buyers in this type of situation include the provision of contractual terms for 
reducing risk associated with commercial dependence (e.g. providing credit for 
investments and input purchases, technical support), long-term contracts or frequent 
extension of contracts (Gow, Streeter and Swinnen, 2000; Bonanno, Russo and 
Menapace, 2018). The types of UTPs that arise from switching costs are identified by 
terms that impose on one of the partners, directly or indirectly, the obligation to make 
specific investments or that associate the provision of credit with specific inputs. 
Asymmetric information and incomplete contracts are also considered a source of 
UTPs. Imperfect information about the probability of an outcome may lead to mistakes 
in business decisions on one side and to the adoption of terms or dispute resolution 
mechanisms that might favour only one party. A stronger player may extract rents 
due to incomplete contracts and may also get better access to information after the 
contract has been concluded (during its execution) through exploiting the gaps in the 
contractual relationship by adjusting the benefits, costs and risks to the detriment of 
the weaker player. Often in the agricultural sector the buyer (e.g. the processor) 
conducts quality tests and thus can accrue information rents by reporting that quality 
levels are lower than they actually are so that the price paid to farmers is reduced. In 
addition, buyers may take advantage of ambiguous quality requirements in the 
contract by using these to reject surplus deliveries when farmers’ production is 
particularly high (e.g. because of good weather conditions) or when demand for 
buyers’ products is depressed. Generally, third-party quality verification is proposed to 
avoid this type of UTP (Pultrone, 2012; Saenger, Torero and Qaim, 2014). 
Thus, contracts that are agreed when there is asymmetric information may incentivize 
exploitation by, for instance, shifting commercial risks to, or imposing additional 
obligations on, the weaker party through ambiguous contract terms. Other 
consequences of asymmetric information may include the use of threatening or 
abusive behaviour in an attempt to obtain an economic advantage. It is also often 
reported that ambiguous contract terms can lead to overdue contractual disputes. 
The asymmetric costs of contract enforcement are another cause of UTPs. These costs 
arise when firms have expensive and unequal access to dispute resolution 
mechanisms for enforcing contractual arrangements. The dispute resolution 
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mechanism can be private (e.g. through voluntary codes of conduct or independent 
dispute resolution mechanisms), judicial (through the courts) or administrative 
(through government-set administrative authorities). Each dispute resolution 
mechanism has implications for who incurs the costs and their magnitude. In the case 
of administrative enforcement, the administration incurs the costs, while in the case of 
private and judicial enforcement the costs are usually borne by the private sector (e.g. 
farmers or buyers). The size of and differences in the costs of dispute resolution 
mechanisms for various actors in the food supply chain not only have important 
income distributional effects but also have implications for the effectiveness of the 
enforcement itself and thus potentially for the occurrence of UTPs. For example, small 
farms may not have sufficient financial resources to finance lengthy court disputes, 
and also they may be risk averse when it comes to agreeing to compensate the 
opponent’s legal expenses in the event of an unfavourable ruling. In contrast, large 
firms are often better financially endowed and more likely to bear the costs of legal 
actions, especially against small players. The high costs of contract enforcement may 
deter small firms from entering into legal disputes or it may make legal action on their 
part a non-credible threat in the event of a contractual breach. This may be exploited 
by a stronger counter-party inflicting UTPs on its trading partner, especially if the 
latter faces higher dispute resolution costs, making legal action on its part less 
credible. Furthermore, the so-called fear factor may come into play, particularly for 
repeated transactions or in a long-term business relationship with the same partner. 
The fear of damaging the business relationship by taking the dispute to the courts or a 
third party may lead to inaction on the part of the victim (Butler and Herbert, 2014; 
Iamicelli and Cafaggi, 2017; Swinnen and Vandevelde, 2017). 
Perishability of goods and seasonality of production affect the costs of storage and 
transportation. Highly perishable goods cannot be easily stored and transported, 
limiting the geographical area where they can be marketed. If perishable goods are 
seasonal, then temporal trade cannot be fully exploited. Farmers have to distribute 
their products to the market within a relatively short time in the season when supply 
is usually high. As a result, because of the costly geographical and temporal trade, 
producers rely on local markets and oversupply the market in high production season. 
Overall, the cost of storage and transportation, combined with limited local 
competition, reduces the bargaining power of suppliers of perishable and seasonal 
goods in commercial negotiations and makes them more vulnerable to UTPs. 
The nature of the aforementioned trading practices may have various adverse impacts 
on the functioning of EU food supply chains in general, and may negatively affect 
various aspects of farmer decision-making processes in particular. UTPs are, 
importantly, linked to the way contractual terms between farmers and buyers (e.g. 
processors) are negotiated, how they are set and how they are respected during the 
business relationship. This directly translates into revenues earned and costs incurred 
by farmers, which affects farm profitability. Reduced farm profitability may lead to 
more farmers leaving the industry, disincentivize new entrants to the sector, reduce 
investments and suppress improvements in productivity. Reduced investment may be 
particularly likely to occur in business relationships where farmers are required to 
invest in specialized sunk assets. UTPs may contribute to increased market 
uncertainty, which distorts farmers’ investment decisions and therefore limits 
innovation and growth. As a result of these effects, at the aggregate level, UTPs can 
influence the competitiveness of the sector as a whole (increase chances of farm exit, 
inhibit market entry) and may lead to market failures (e.g. driving out high-quality 
products from the market). Furthermore, UTPs may affect how income is distributed 
and passed along the food supply chain. For example, powerful intermediaries may 
not pass the gains earned from downstream industries on to farmers but retain them. 
It is commonly argued that small farmers are most vulnerable to UTPs and most likely 
to be affected by these unfavourable outcomes (Fałkowski et al., 2017; Gorton, Lemke 
and Alfarsi, 2017). 
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2.2. Empirical literature 
There are few empirical studies in the literature investigating the incidence of UTPs in 
the farming sector. This is particularly true for the literature that considers (implicitly 
or explicitly) UTPs’ multidimensionality. An attempt in this direction is the study by 
Basic (2015), which analyses UTPs in the banana sector. The study considers various 
forms of UTPs rather than focusing on a restricted set of possible forms. The study 
attempts to analyse both the occurrence and the impacts of UTPs. A similar attempt is 
made in the study by Copa-Cogeca (2013a, 2013b), which conducted a survey in the 
European agri-food sector to quantify the occurrence and impacts of UTPs in the EU 
food supply chain. However, to our knowledge an overall assessment of the 
occurrence of and a quantification of the impacts of the various forms of UTPs have 
not been conducted in a scientific study on UTPs. 
The empirical literature that deals with one or selected forms of UTPs is much larger 
(see, for example, Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani, 2002; MacDonald and Key, 2012; 
Perekhozhuk et al., 2016; Vavra and Goodwin, 2005; Assefa, Kuiper and Meuwissen, 
2014; Katchova, 2013; Assefa et al., 2014, Otsuka, Nakano and Takahashi, 2016; 
Potts, Fernandez and Wunderlich, 2007). This literature considers one or selected 
aspects of UTPs without providing a comprehensive analysis of all relevant elements of 
UTPs. Note that UTPs are not necessarily the primary focus of these studies. They 
usually analyse how contracting, governance and other aspects of inter-firm 
interactions in the food supply chain impact, among others, welfare effects, firm 
performance and price transmission and not whether “unfairness” in business 
relationships occurs. 
The study by Basic (2015) analyses the incidence of UTPs in relationships between 
banana buyers in Europe and banana producers in exporting developing countries 
based on interviews with more than 60 people involved in the banana industry in 
several Latin American countries and also on a survey conducted in Costa Rica. The 
study reveals several UTPs in banana supply chains, such as (i) one-sided clauses in 
contracts that stipulate that “the buyer can withdraw from the contract at any point in 
time if his margin is insufficient” (i.e. transfer of risks to exporters and producers); (ii) 
increased occurrence of last-minute cancellations, rejections and/or quality claims 
during low-price (oversupplied) seasons (asymmetric risk sharing); and (iii) small 
producers often being used as buffer suppliers by large plantations. Small producers 
are also regularly charged extra costs by exporters and plantations for alleged 
“services” (e.g. for providing banana boxes and for transport), which can amount to 
40% of the price stipulated in the contract. The study also reveals the presence of fear 
factor among banana producers that the commercial relationship could be terminated 
if they were to raise a complaint against the buyer. 
Copa-Cogeca (2013a, 2013b) conducted a survey in the European agri-food sector to 
quantify the types and frequency of UTPs in the EU and to evaluate the economic 
impacts of UTPs. The survey covered 434 professionals among 3 main target groups – 
farmers (214), agri-food cooperatives (165) and others (e.g. processors) (55) – from 
21 EU countries. The survey considered 17 different forms of UTPs that may occur in 
the food supply chain. The results show that the surveyed firms tended to be more 
exposed to UTPs at the time when the survey was conducted than in the past (5 years 
previously). Almost every sampled firm (94% of all sampled firms) was affected by at 
least one UTP. Similar results were found for farmers, with 94% of them experiencing 
at least one UTP. The five most frequent UTPs were (i) imposing a requirement to fund 
the cost of promotion (59% of respondents), (ii) imposing general terms and 
conditions that contained unfair clauses (56%), (iii) refusing to put or avoiding putting 
essential terms in writing (51%); (iv) threatening business disruption (or termination) 
to obtain an advantage (51%); and (v) imposing a requirement to fund a contracting 
party’s proprietary business activity (48%). Farmers reported that UTPs most often 
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occurred during the post-contractual phase (in 44% of sampled farms), followed by 
during the pre-contractual phase (25%) and during contractual negotiations (20%). 
The rest of the surveyed farmers (21%) did not know or did not answer the question 
regarding at which stage of contractual relations UTPs occurred. Around 45% of 
farmers were at least occasionally exposed to all 17 UTPs considered in the study. 
The results of a survey conducted by the Spanish Competition Authority, with the aim 
of analysing relations between suppliers and retailers in the food sector, show that 
56% of responding suppliers were frequently or occasionally subject to retroactive 
changes to contract terms (CNC, 2011). Similarly, a survey conducted by the Italian 
Competition Authority shows that 57% of producers often or always accepted 
retroactive unilateral changes in contract terms because they were afraid of losing the 
commercial relationship if they refused the changes (Italian Competition Authority, 
2013). 
CIAA-AIM (2011) surveyed about 686 companies from processing and retail sectors in 
15 MS to analyse the incidence and impacts of UTPs. The survey results show that 
almost all surveyed companies (96%) were exposed to UTPs. The most common UTPs 
were (i) lack of respect of contractual terms by some customers (84%), de-listing 
threats to obtain unjustified advantages (77%) and unilateral deductions from invoice 
payments without sound business reasons (63%). Most of the surveyed firms (65%) 
did not take action when confronted with UTPs because of fear of 
customer/commercial sanctions, while 50% of surveyed firms did not do so because 
they did not trust the effectiveness of the available public dispute resolution 
mechanism (CIAA-AIM, 2011). 
Davis and Reilly (2010) reported the results of the UK Competition Commission’s 
survey carried out among 456 suppliers on UTPs exercised by retailers in the previous 
5 years. According to the survey results, between 37% and 48% of surveyed suppliers 
experienced practices such as payment delays, excessive payments to complaining 
customers, additional services required and retrospective price adjustments. 
A common UTP reported in the literature is delayed payments. For example, Berdegué 
(2001) reported 60 to 70 days’ delay in payments after delivery practised by 
supermarkets with respect to small farmers’ economic associations in the fresh fruit 
and vegetable sector in Chile. Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000) reported an average 
payment delay of 100 days by food processors to farms supplying raw materials in 
Slovakia in the early transition period in 1994 and 1995. The survey results of Davis 
and Reilly (2010) indicated that 48% of suppliers in the UK had experienced payment 
delays by retailers in the previous 5 years. 
The literature on standards and globalization offers some implications for UTPs, the 
effect of which can go in both directions. The increased globalization of food markets 
and the growing foreign direct investment in the food sector have brought about 
radical changes in the functioning and organization of supply chains. Some of the key 
features of this development have been the expansion of vertical integration and the 
introduction of higher food quality and safety standards for farmers from developed 
countries. Modern retailing and processing companies (multinationals) increasingly 
dominate international and local markets in the food sectors and influence the global 
trade by setting the standards for food quality (Reardon et al., 2002, 2003; Reardon 
and Swinnen, 2004; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Reardon and Barrett, 2000). 
Critics of the expansion of global retailing and processing companies argue that these 
firms create unfair competition with local firms in developing countries, exploit local 
labour and are poorly integrated into local economies (Razafindrakoto and Roubaud, 
2002). An increasing number of studies are analysing the socio-economic impacts of 
foreign investment and the establishment of multinationals in developing countries, 
providing mixed evidence. Several studies indicate adverse effects or insignificant 
benefits of foreign direct investment and multinationals on (small) farmers, labour and 
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local communities (see, for example, Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon and Barrett, 
2000; Reardon et al., 2003; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Delgado, 1999; 
Weatherspoon et al., 2001; Nunnenkamp, 2004). These results are in contrast with 
those of other studies that have found that (small) farmers and local labour benefit 
from foreign direct investment and multinationals as a result of a combination of 
effects, such as improved access to inputs, credit, extension services and technology 
adoption, as well as productivity spillover effects and greater income stability (Gow, 
Streeter and Swinnen, 2000; Swinnen, Beerlandt and Dries, 2003; Dries and Swinnen, 
2004; Maertens, Colen and Swinnen, 2011; Maertens and Swinnen, 2012; Vandeplas 
et al., 2013). Another finding of these studies is that the growth in foreign direct 
investment and multinationals has led to the introduction and spread of innovative 
contractual arrangements, which has caused a reduction in UTPs, among others, by 
reducing/eliminating delayed payments, providing better contract terms and providing 
better arrangements for contract enforcement (see, for example, Gow, Streeter and 
Swinnen, 2000; Swinnen, Beerlandt and Dries, 2003; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). 
Evidence from the transition process from central planned system to market system in 
Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s showed that foreign direct investment and 
the entry of multinational processing companies contributed to a reduction in UTPs. 
One of the effects of the transition process was the break-up of the pre-reform system 
of contracting and contract enforcement in the overall economy, including in the agri-
food sector. With imperfectly developed market and legal institutions, enforcement 
problems within the agri-food sector caused contractual disruptions during the 
transition process to market-based institutions. In the absence of credible and 
enforceable contractual arrangements, the opportunity existed for parties involved in 
the contractual relations (especially those with bargaining power) to engage in UTPs 
with the aim of extracting rents. This behaviour was particularly prevalent when one 
party made investments specific to the business relationship, allowing the other party 
to appropriate quasi-rents by renegotiating the contractual terms ex-post (i.e. the 
hold-up problem) (Gow, Streeter and Swinnen, 2000; Gow and Swinnen, 2000). The 
entry of foreign direct investment into transition economies allowed food processing 
companies to introduce private, self-enforcing contractual arrangements to incentivize 
farms to make contract-specific investments. These innovative contractual 
arrangements introduced by private capital reduced the occurrence of UTPs (Gow, 
Streeter and Swinnen, 2000; Gow and Swinnen, 2000; Dries and Swinnen, 2004). For 
example, Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000), using a case study of a sugar processing 
company in Slovakia from the transition period in the 1990s, showed that the 
innovative private contractual arrangements introduced by a foreign sugar processing 
company led to a reduction in UTPs. Before the domestic sugar processing company 
was acquired by the foreign company (i.e. before 1993), it was involved in UTPs, 
particularly in long delays in payments (of up to several months) to farms for sugar 
beet deliveries.2 After the acquisition in 1993, the company introduced several 
contractual innovations to make contracts self-enforcing and thus reduce the 
likelihood of a hold-up, as perceived by the beet producers. This included input 
provision and an investment facilitation programme for farms that signed long-term 
sugar beet delivery contracts with the company; a fixed base price, slightly higher 
than the prevailing market price, to be paid on time; bonuses and penalties depending 
on the quality of the sugar beet delivered; and technical support and extension 
programmes (e.g. agronomical support, soil testing, and production and managerial 
advice).3 Additionally, these contractual arrangements reduced hold-up costs for sugar 
                                           
2 The payment delays effectively provided the processing company with an interest-free loan. With the high 
inflation rate in Slovakia in the early 1990s, the implicit rent extraction from farmers was significant. 
3 Through the input provision facilitation programme, farmers could purchase inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizer, 
chemicals) at reduced prices that were negotiated by the processing company with suppliers; in addition, 
the processing company guaranteed the repayment of the input purchases. For the investment facilitation 
programme, the processing company guaranteed the repayment of farms’ loans and provided the farms 
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beet farms because the contractual commitments increased the relationship-specificity 
of transactions for the processing company (Gow, Streeter and Swinnen, 2000).4 
The empirical literature suggests that UTPs have significant impacts on farmers’ 
performance and that the effects may take different forms. The analysis conducted by 
Basic (2015) of the global banana supply chain suggests that UTPs accelerate the 
disappearance of small banana producers and contribute to worsening working 
conditions in Latin American countries. The survey by Copa-Cogeca (2013a, 2013b) 
reveals that the five most important negative impacts of UTPs on farmers (as reported 
by surveyed farmers in EU) relate to profitability (72% of surveyed farmers), cost 
uncertainty (70%), turnover (67%), costs of delayed payments (67%) and 
relationships with contractors (64%). Copa-Cogeca (2013a, 2013b) estimates the total 
aggregated costs of UTPs at EUR 10.9 billion for the agricultural sector for the 21 EU 
countries studied, of which EUR 4.8 billion is the cost to farmers and EUR 6.4 billion is 
the cost to agri-food cooperatives. The survey results of CIAA-AIM (2011) for 
processing and retail firms in 15 MS show that UTPs have a negative impact on firms’ 
costs (83% of all respondents), sales (77%) and innovation (40%). The estimated 
costs of UTPs represented 0.5% of the turnover of the surveyed firms (CIAA-AIM, 
2011). Gow, Streeter and Swinnen (2000) show that the reduction in UTPs caused by 
the introduction of innovative contractual arrangements by private foreign capital in 
the sugar sector in Slovakia during the transition period in the 1990s had a significant 
positive effect on the output and efficiency of both sugar processing companies and 
sugar beet farmers. The evidence suggests that promotion of fairtrade practices5 in 
developing countries may provide farmers with, inter alia, increased stability, fairer 
remuneration, greater capacity, less price uncertainty, better market access and more 
equitable distribution of income along the supply chain (see, for example, Beyer, 
2008). However, the findings in the empirical literature suggest that the impact of 
fairtrade may not always be straightforward and that positive effects may not 
materialise for small farmers (DeFries et al., 2017) 
                                                                                                                               
with an interest rate subsidy between 3% and 7%. By accepting the residual claim on these investments 
through guarantees made to the companies providing inputs and credit to the farms, the processing 
company effectively increased its own costs of contractual breach, thus making its fulfilment of the contract 
obligations more likely and more credible (Gow, Streeter and Swinnen, 2000). 
4 For example, in the event of delayed payments, farms would not have to pay for their purchased inputs 
and would lose only returns on their labour and personal capital contributions. The investment in technical 
support and extension programmes for farms increased the level of relationship-specific investment that the 
processing company had committed to farmers’ human capital (Gow, Streeter and Swinnen, 2000). 
5 In principle, fairtrade is a concept opposed to UTPs. The promotion of fairtrade in developing countries 
aims to achieve better trading conditions (to avoid UTPs) and thus is expected to generate positive impacts 
on farmers and/or local communities. 
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3. Survey design and sample description 
The analyses carried out as part of this study were based on a cross-sectional dairy 
farm survey, which used a stratified multi-stage sampling procedure with a random 
selection of the final sample units (i.e. dairy farms). The core sample comprised 
farmers who managed a dairy farm in 2016/2017 and for at least 2 consecutive 
previous years. The survey covered five regions in four EU countries: Germany 
(Bayern), France (Normandie), Poland (Podlaskie) and Spain (Galicia and Asturias). 
The 1248 surveyed farms were split as follows: 204 in Bayern, 204 in Normandie, 335 
in Podlaskie, 405 in Galicia and 100 in Asturias. Data were collected through face-to-
face interviews between April and August 2017 using a computer-assisted personal 
interviewing (CAPI) system. 
The countries covered by the survey were selected to reflect the importance of dairy 
production in the EU. For each country one NUTS2 region was selected, except for 
Spain where two regions were considered. Regions were selected to reflect the most 
important dairy production region(s) in the country. The sample was stratified by farm 
size (i.e. number of dairy cows per farm). The number of dairy cows and the number 
of farmers were considered to determine the sample size per strata (i.e. by farm size). 
The data were collected for 2016 and also, for some variables, for 2014 and 10 years 
ago (2006). 
3.1. Sample design 
The study implemented a stratified multi-stage sampling procedure with a random 
selection of the final sample units. Stratified sampling focuses on characteristics of 
particular subgroups of interest and thus facilitates comparisons between the groups. 
That is, the sample was stratified based on selected dairy farm characteristics. 
The following steps were involved in the sample design and data collection: 
1. In the first stage, the NUTS2 regions were selected. 
2. In the second stage, the sampled dairy farms at local level were selected. 
In the first stage, the NUTS2 regions with the highest head counts (dairy cows) and 
numbers of dairy holders (dairy farmers) at country level were selected, except in the 
cases of Poland and Spain, where the highest count of dairy cows/holders was shared 
by Mazowieckie and Castilla-León, respectively. The total number of cows combined 
with the number of holders was considered for the stratification of primary units (dairy 
farms). Based on these two characteristics, the distribution of primary units per 
stratum was determined for all five NUTS2 regions. 
Once the stratification for the regions was completed, in the second stage, farms 
dedicated to dairy production were contacted at local level, rotating between the 
different contact points to ensure a random selection of dairy farmers. The procedure 
for contacting dairy farmers was adjusted at country level according to specific local 
characteristics and can be summarised as follows: 
● Local agrarian offices at the municipality level (contact points) were 
contacted to obtain contact details for dairy farmers. In France and 
Germany, pre-existing databases were used to obtain farmers’ contact 
details. 
● In total, around 339 contact points (municipalities) were reached in the 
surveyed NUTS2 regions. 
● Once the list of potential contact points was established, interviewers were 
randomly rotated among contact points to ensure a random selection of 
dairy farmers. 
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● Finally, the place and time of the interview (at home or at another location) 
was agreed with the sampled dairy farmers. 
3.1.1. Sample design by region 
The main source of regional data for the number of heads and holders used for the 
stratification of the sample was Eurostat, with the latest available information at 
regional level for 2013. This information was used to calculate the sample size; aware 
of potential bias resulting from outdated information, the sample design was adjusted 
during fieldwork whenever more recent information was available. For example, data 
from local statistical offices were used in France to reflect the most recent information 
on structure of dairy farms in the region. 
The sample stratification was based on farm size as measured by the number of heads 
per farm grouped according to the distribution of cattle in the surveyed regions. Farms 
holding fewer than 2 heads were excluded from the sample because of their low 
impact on the overall country-wide distribution of dairy cows.6 The number of sampled 
farms per stratum was determined by taking the average value of two indicators: (i) 
the number of heads per farm as a proportion of total heads in the region and (ii) the 
number of holders in the region as a proportion of the total dairy farm population in 
the region. This procedure was chosen to take into account both the number of dairy 
farmers and the number of cows in the region. 
Regions were chosen to reflect the regional variation in the importance of dairy 
production in the EU, as well as variations in context and market structure across EU 
regions. For example, a German region was selected for the survey because the 
German dairy sector is the largest in the EU. In the past decade or so, milk production 
in Germany has increased. The milk delivered to dairies increased on average by 1.4% 
annually in the period 2005–2016. The number of dairy cows was stagnant over the 
same period, indicating an improvement in productivity (Figure 1, Figure 2). The 
majority of milk produced by dairy farmers in Germany (around 67%) is delivered to 
processing cooperatives. For the rest of the milk deliveries (around 33%), farmers 
have contractual arrangements with private processors (European Commission, 
2016b; Wijnands, Bijman and Tramnitzke, 2017). 
                                           
6 The removal of these farms did not significantly affect the sample, given that more than 91% of dairy 
farms in the sampled regions had more than two cows. 
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Figure 1. The evolution of milk deliveries in France, Germany, Poland and 
Spain (1984–2017) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on Eurostat data. 
 
Figure 2. The evolution of the number of dairy cows in France, Germany, 
Poland and Spain (1984–2017) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on Eurostat data. 
In Germany, the region of Bayern was selected for the study because it is ranked first 
nationally using the combined number of holders and heads at regional level. Bayern 
accounts for almost half (48%) of the dairy cow holders in Germany. However, a 
downward trend in the number of cows has occurred in Bayern in the past decade (i.e. 
–0.6% annually in the period 2005–2016), in contrast with country-level 
developments (Figure 3). 
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Table 1 shows the distribution of the number of dairy cows and the number of holders 
in the total regional population and the sample size constructed based on these two 
indicators. Farmers with more than 100 cows are highly represented in the sample 
(37% of the total), followed by farmers owning between 50 and 99 cows (34%). 
Farmers with fewer than 50 cows but more than 19 cows represent 23%, while those 
with fewer than 20 cows constitute about 6% of the total sample. 
Figure 3. The evolution of the number of dairy cows in the study regions 
(1984–2017) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on Eurostat data. 
Table 1. Sample design for Bayern 
Farm groups (no 
of heads per 
farm) 
Holders Cows Sample 
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
3–19 3780 10.1 25,600 2.1 12 6.1 
20–49 11,670 31.1 195,280 15.8 47 23.4 
50–99 12,830 34.1 409,080 33.0 67 33.6 
≥ 100 9300 24.7 608,980 49.2 74 37.0 
Total 37,580 100.0 1,238,940 100.0 200 100.0 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
France is the second largest milk producer in the EU and has a rich history of dairy 
production. Although the number of dairy cows has continuously declined over time, 
the production of milk has increased in the past two decades, albeit with significant 
fluctuations between years (Figure 1, Figure 2). French dairy farmers deliver around 
half of the milk they produce (around 53%) to collecting and processing cooperatives 
and the other half (around 47%) to private processors (European Commission, 2016b; 
Wijnands, Bijman and Tramnitzke, 2017). 
In France, the Normandie region (Basse and Haute) was covered by the survey. 
Normandie was selected because it is one of the key dairy production regions in 
France. Furthermore, the distribution of dairy farms is similar to that at national level. 
The regional trend in number of cows shows a similar pattern to that for France as a 
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whole. Over the period 2005–2016, heads decreased on average by around 0.5% 
annually in Normandie. 
Table 2 shows the number of dairy cows and holders in Normandie and the aggregate 
figures at national level. The designed sample size is 204 dairy farms. The distribution 
of the sample for Normandie by farm size is reported in Table 3. Farmers with more 
than 50 or more but fewer than 100 cows are the most heavily represented in the 
sample (44%), followed by farmers owning between 20 and 49 cows (40%). Large 
farmers, owning 100 or more cows, represent 12% of the overall sample, while the 
smallest farms represents only 4% of the sample. 
Table 2. France sample design: dairy cows and holders for the sampling area 
 
Holders Cows Sample 
Basse-Normandie 9380 466,685 204 
Haute-Normandie 2435 124,285 
 
Total Normandie 11,815 590,970 
 
    Total France 92,540 3,737,180 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
Table 3. Sample design for Normandie 
Farm groups (no 
of cows per farm) 
Holders Cows Sample 
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
3–19 1020 8.63 2780 0.47 8 3.92 
20–49 960 8.12 10,650 1.80 82 40.20 
50–99 1830 15.48 52,560 8.89 89 43.63 
≥ 100 8010 67.77 524,990 88.83 25 12.25 
Total 11,820 100.00 590,980 100.00 204 100.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
Spain is another important milk-producing country in the EU. After a period of 
stagnation, the country experienced upward growth; on average in the period 2005–
2016 milk deliveries to dairies grew by around 1.3% per year. Similarly to France, the 
number of dairy cows has continuously decreased, although at a higher rate than in 
France, particularly in the past decade. On average, the number of cows decreased in 
Spain by around 2% per year, compared with 0.5% in France, during the period 
2005–2016 (Figure 1, Figure 2). 
Spanish dairy farmers deliver the smallest share of milk produced (around 35%) to 
collecting and processing cooperatives, compared with the other countries covered by 
the survey. The remainder (around 65%) is delivered to private processors or through 
other contractual arrangements (European Commission, 2016b; Wijnands, Bijman and 
Tramnitzke, 2017). 
Of the 17 Spanish NUTS2 regions, Galicia was selected because it ranks first in terms 
of numbers of cows and holders. Similarly, Asturias was selected because of the 
particular structure of its dairy sector. The trend in cow numbers in the two regions 
follows a similar pattern to that at national level with, however, a stronger decline 
observed in Asturias than in Galicia: on average, a –2.3% and a –1.3% annual 
decline, respectively, during the period 2005–2016 (Figure 3). 
17 
Table 4. Spain sample design: dairy cows and holders by selected NUTS2 
regions 
Spain Holders Cows Sample 
 Galicia 12,570 346,220 
500  Asturias 2920 81,550 
Total sampling area 15,490 427,770 
Total for Spain 23,530 876,070 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
The two selected regions together cover 61% of total dairy cow holders at national 
level and about half (48.8%) of all the dairy farms in Spain. The distribution of 
interviews (405) between the two selected regions was set proportionally to the final 
weight of each region with regard to the total numbers of dairy cows and holders. 
The sample constructions for Galicia and Asturias are reported in Table 5 and Table 6, 
respectively. The highest represented farm groups in the sample are dairy farms with 
a number of cows between 20 and 49 or between 50 and 99 in Galicia (each group 
forms around 30% of the total sample) and between 3 and 19 cows or between 20 
and 49 cows in Asturias (each group forms around 28% of the total sample). The 
smallest represented farms in the sample are large farms in both regions (those with 
100 or more cows per farm). 
Table 5. Sample design for Galicia 
Farm groups (no 
of cows per farm) 
Holders Cows Sample 
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
3–19 2920 25.55 20950 6.08 86 21.23 
20–49 4630 40.51 94470 27.40 123 30.37 
50–99 2600 22.75 105040 30.46 125 30.86 
≥ 100 1280 11.20 124360 36.07 71 17.53 
Total 11430 100.00 344820 100.00 405 100.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
 
Table 6. Sample design for Asturias 
Farm groups (no of 
cows per farm) 
Holders Cows Sample 
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
3–19 630 23.08 2350 2.89 28 28.00 
20–49 1060 38.83 20780 25.55 29 29.00 
50–99 610 22.34 25680 31.57 21 21.00 
≥ 100 430 15.75 32530 39.99 22 22.00 
Total 2730 100.00 81340 100.00 100 100.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
Milk production is one of the most important agricultural sectors in Poland. Dairy 
production accounted for more than 20% of the overall value of agricultural production 
in 2013. In the past decade, the trends in milk production and cow numbers have 
diverged significantly in the country: while production has expanded, the number of 
dairy cows has decreased dramatically. On average, milk deliveries increased by 2.2% 
while the number of dairy cows fell by 2.1% per year during the period 2006–2016 
(Figure 1, Figure 2). The majority of milk produced by Polish dairy farmers (around 
75%) goes to collecting and processing cooperatives. Milk delivered to private 
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processors represents 25% of the total produced in Poland (European Commission, 
2016b; Wijnands, Bijman and Tramnitzke, 2017). 
Podlaskie was selected for this study because it is one of the largest dairy production 
regions in Poland. In contrast to the national trend, cow numbers showed an upwards 
trend to 2009, followed by a decline in the subsequent period (Figure 3). 
The distribution of the sample by farm size is reported in Table 7. In contrast to the 
other four regions considered in this study, Podlaskie is dominated to a large extent by 
small dairy farms. Small dairy farms (between 3 and 19 cows per farm) represent 
around 36% of in the total sample. Large farms (with 100 or more cows per farm) 
constitute the smallest share (5%), while the two farm classes considered “middle 
size” (20–49 and 50–99) together account for around 49% of the total. 
Table 7. Sample design for Podlaskie  
Farm groups (no of 
cows per farm) 
Holders Cows Sample 
Abs. % Abs. % Abs. % 
3–19 13,690 46.16 61,430 14.09 120 35.82 
20–49 11,280 38.03 191,810 44.01 132 39.40 
50–99 4050 13.65 136,060 31.22 67 20.00 
≥ 100 640 2.16 46,570 10.68 16 4.78 
Total 29,660 100.00 435,870 100.00 335 100.00 
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Eurostat, 2013. 
3.1.2. Sampling approach 
The study aimed to conduct a total of 1300 interviews, at least 210 per country. The 
final sample obtained comprises 1248 interviews. The sample distribution by country 
is reported in Table 8. 
The data collection process involved the following steps: 
1. Testing of the questionnaire − pre-piloting (Q test). In this phase, 30 
interviews were conducted across the different regions as follows: 10 in Spain,10 
in Poland, 5 in France and 5 in Germany. The 30 dairy farms were selected to 
account for different farm sizes. The aim of pre-piloting was to evaluate the 
feasibility of conducting the interviews in local languages and to test the 
comprehensiveness and understanding of the questionnaire. 
2. Pilot phase. In this phase, 70 interviews were carried out as follows: 30 in Spain, 
20 in Poland,10 in France and 10 in Germany. The aim of this second pilot testing 
was to evaluate whether the questionnaire set-up (filters, question rotations, 
quality consistency controls, translations, etc.) had been performed correctly 
according to the initial instructions. 
3. Main fieldwork. The selection of dairy farmers (contact point, questionnaire 
routines and data maps) for the sample differed depending on the country. In 
Spain and Poland, the contact points were obtained from the local agrarian offices. 
In France and Germany, the contact points were retrieved from the available 
statistical information and databases. To ensure wide sample dispersion, a 
maximum of 10 interviews were arranged per contact point. Data collection was 
executed by a total of 36 interviewers – 2 in France, 9 in Germany, 6 in Poland 
and 19 in Spain – coordinated by 1 fieldwork director and 1 supervisor per 
country. The average time taken to complete the questionnaire was 78 minutes. 
The fieldwork lasted from 20 April until 1 August 2017. Figure 4 shows a graphical 
representation of the fieldwork progress by country. 
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Table 8. Total sample by country 
Country Main sample 
France 
204 
Germany 
204 
Poland 
335 
Spain 
505 
Total  1248 
Source: Created by the authors. 
Figure 4. Fieldwork progress 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on information from TNS. 
3.1.3. Sampling errors 
The sampling error was calculated based on a multi-strata probability approach, that 
is, the calculation of the first stratum, given by the ratio between the country and the 
total number of interviews, and the calculation of the second stratum based on the 
probability of the selected farmer being a resident of a particular stratum. The second 
stratum probability was calculated as the ratio between the number of farmers in this 
stratum and the total number of farmers in the country. 
As the sample was obtained by aggregating different sub-samples, the calculation of 
the associated sampling error must also be deduced from the aggregation of sampling 
errors for each country and stratum (Table 9). 
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Table 9. Estimation of the sampling error 
Country 
(target region) 
Sample size 
Sampling error for a 
confidence interval (2δ), 
at country level 
Composition of sampling error for a 
confidence interval (2δ) at global level 
Germany 205 ±6.8% 2.04% 
France 205 ±6.8% 0.77% 
Poland 335 ±5.5% 1.07% 
Spain 505 ±4.3% 1.21% 
Total 1248  ±3.95% 
Source: Created by the authors. 
The resulting sampling error for the whole sample was calculated, and its level is 
within the commonly accepted limits of error for socio-economic research, at less than 
10% for a significance level of 95.5%. The individual figures for the composite 
sampling error index calculated for the global index cannot be taken separately. These 
formulas are unbiased in sampling with replacement, meaning that a farmer can be 
replaced by an identically characterized farmer. In our case, involving sampling 
without replacement, despite the randomness with which farmers were selected for 
interview, there was a certain degree of bias, although it is very small because of the 
size of the population considered and the sample size. 
It should also be noted that the calculation of the sampling error associated with our 
sample design took the regions included in the sample as 100% of the geographical 
scope of the demographic group. In the regions covered by the study, a large majority 
of dairy farms in each country were excluded, and therefore a degree of bias is to be 
expected, although this is also very small, as the number of holders discarded in most 
countries was minimal. 
3.2. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was developed based on previous analysis carried out as part of the 
COMPETE project.7 The questionnaire was centred on the following three main 
aspects: 
1. capturing the contractual arrangements present in the dairy sector; 
2. investigating the presence of UTPs in the contract content and in different 
phases of the contract development; 
3. comparing the performance of the dairy sector across EU countries in order to 
identify circumstances in which UTPs are more likely. 
Standard principles of survey design were used to establish a conceptual basis for the 
questionnaire before the specific questions were designed, and, furthermore, a 
literature review of studies on the types of UTPs in the food supply chain and the 
contractual arrangements of dairy farmers was conducted before the questionnaire 
was designed. As a result, the following main elements were addressed by questions 
included in the questionnaire: 
1. farm characteristics; 
2. dairy production characteristics; 
3. contract characteristics; 
                                           
7 COMPETE project: International comparisons of product supply chains in the agro-food sectors: 
determinants of their competitiveness and performance on EU and international markets 
(http://www.compete-project.eu). 
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4. UTPs. 
The first version of the questionnaire was pre‐piloted in Galicia to establish its face 
validity. During this phase, four observers (two from TNS, one interviewer and one 
representative of the Joint Research Centre) attended the interviews. Comments from 
the four external observers taking part in the survey were used to adjust the 
questionnaire (e.g. rewording the questions, adding more questions). The 
questionnaire was conducted using a tablet and with software developed for this 
purpose. This allowed the interviewed farmers to easily follow the questions and 
automatically answer the relevant ones. 
In their answers to several questions, respondents were asked to provide responses 
for three different periods, namely 2016, 2014 and 10 years ago. The rationale behind 
this approach was to assess the trends in the issues raised by the questions as well as 
to potentially capture the effects of the abolition of the milk quota. 
3.3. Sample weights 
The purpose of sample weights is (i) to derive survey statistics representative of the 
underlying population or (ii) to compensate for over- or under-sampling of specific 
cases or for disproportionate stratification. The two most common types of weighting 
system are (i) design weights and (ii) post-stratification or non-response weights. 
The design weight corrects for differences in respondents’ selection probabilities, 
making the sample more representative of a “true” sample of individuals in a given 
area. The design weight is usually used to compensate for over- or under-sampling of 
specific cases or for disproportionate stratifications. The design weights are calculated 
as the normalized inverse of the selection probabilities. That is, the weight is 
calculated as the inverse of the sampling fraction of each respondent included in the 
survey (Johnson, 2008; Fotini, Evangelia and Michai, 2013). 
Conversely, the post-stratiﬁcation weight aims to minimize the difference between 
population parameters and the realized sample characteristics. It is generally used to 
compensate for the variation in response likelihood between respondent types. 
Calculating the post-stratiﬁcation weight is normally more difficult than constructing 
design weights, as it requires the use of auxiliary information about the population to 
reduce the sampling error and potential non-response bias (PEAS, 2009; ESS, 2014). 
In this study, we used the post-stratiﬁcation weight. The reason for this was that the 
survey tended to over-represent large and under-represent small farmers. As auxiliary 
information for calculating the post-stratiﬁcation weight we used the most recent 
census on the number of dairy holders and cows, available from Eurostat. We used 
these weights to calculate the survey results reported in the following sections. 
The post-stratiﬁcation weight for each region considered in the survey was calculated 
as follows (see also the example in Table 10): 
1. calculating the ratio of the number of dairy holders belonging to a certain farm 
size group (i.e. in terms of number of cows) to the total number of dairy 
holders, using population data from Eurostat; 
2. calculating the ratio of the number of dairy holders belonging to a certain farm 
size group (i.e. in terms of number of cows) to the total number of dairy 
holders for the survey data; 
3. dividing the first ratio by the second ratio. 
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Table 10. Example of calculation of post-stratiﬁcation weight 
Farm size (no of cows) Number of holders 
 
 
Eurostat Sample Weight 
3–19 2920 20,950 1.203 
20–49 4630 94,470 1.334 
50–99 2600 105,040 0.737 
≥ 100 1280 124,360 0.639 
Total 11,430 344,820 1.000 
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4. Farm characteristics and dairy production 
4.1 Farm characteristics 
Bayern is the EU’s leading milk-producing region, with a long tradition in the dairy 
sector going back more than three centuries. The activity is generally passed down 
from generation to generation and carried out mainly by family farms. Similarly, in 
Podlaskie and both Spanish regions (Galicia and Asturias), more than 90% of farms 
are family farms. In Normandie, however, this does not appear to be the rule of 
thumb. Individual family farming in this region constitutes only 20%, whereas the 
majority of dairy holders take the form of private corporations (81%). In addition, in 
Normandie 97% of farming activity is combined with other activities, predominantly 
cultivation of arable crops (e.g. cereals). Conversely, in Asturias, more than 77% of 
farmers are exclusively dedicated to dairy and meat production (18%). 
Notwithstanding, in all the five regions the manager of the dairy farm is almost always 
a family member; in Normandie, 22% are hired labour managers. Managers usually 
work exclusively and full time for the farm, except in Bayern, where 7% of managers 
work part time. 
Figure 5 shows the population pyramid of dairy managers across the five regions. In 
the majority of cases, farm management is carried out by a man, with men 
representing, on average, 76% of the overall sample. The average age of head 
farmers ranges between 43 and 48 years for men and between 45 and 54 years for 
women. The highest shares of female managers are found in the two Spanish regions. 
Women leading dairy farms represent 32% and 27% in Galicia and Asturias, 
respectively, while in the other regions they constitute less than 28%, with Bayern 
having only 8% of farms managed by women. 
The level of education attained by managers (heads of farms) is another element that 
differs across regions. The majority of managers in Galicia and Asturias have primary 
education, at 55% and 53% of surveyed farmers, respectively. In other regions, the 
vast majority of managers have reached at least secondary education. Normandie has 
the highest share of managers with a higher degree, at 8%, and the majority of them 
are female. In Bayern, 21% of managers have received vocational training, 
particularly women (61% of female managers). This region also has the highest share 
of managers with a university degree (73%). In Podlaskie, it appears that most 
managers have secondary education or vocational training (42% in both cases) (Table 
11). 
It is interesting to see how the composition of unpaid family labour differs across 
regions. Overall, across all regions, 83% of farms use unpaid family labour (i.e. the 
spouse of the head of the farm and/or other family members, excluding the head of 
the farm). Podlaskie has the highest share of farms using unpaid family labour, with 
the spouse of the head of the farm and/or other family members working on 99% of 
surveyed farms, followed by Bayern (91%), Asturias (76%), Galicia (76%) and 
Normandie (65%). Regarding paid labour, 32% of all surveyed farms used permanent 
or seasonal hired workers. This varies among regions, from 16% in Asturias to 68% in 
Normandie.8 
Another significant difference between regions appears in relation to labour cost. On 
average in 2016 in Galicia a hired worker cost about EUR 56 per day, while in Asturias 
the cost was EUR37 per day. This is almost double in the remaining regions, ranging 
between EUR 94 per day in Normandie and EUR 110 per day in Bayern.9 The labour 
costs declared for 2016 do not diverge significantly from those for 10 years ago, 
                                           
8 Note that 48% of surveyed farmers did not respond to the question on hired labour use. 
9 The results indicating high labour costs in Podlaskie are likely to reflect the low rate of responses to this 
question. 
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except in Podlaskie and Normandie, where they increased on average by EUR 34 and 
EUR 29, respectively. Note that the majority of surveyed farmers from Podlaskie and 
Normandie (96% and 70%, respectively), as with the question on paid labour, did not 
to respond to this question, implying that the labour cost for these regions may not be 
representative. 
Figure 5. Population pyramid of dairy managers in surveyed regions 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
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Table 11. Education level of farm managers by gender and region (% of 
respondents) 
  Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie Total 
 
Male 
 
Primary or below (< 16 years) 55 53 2 0 6 24 
Secondary (16–18 years) 21 25 48 5 42 29 
University (19–22 years) 5 2 23 74 10 20 
Higher 1 2 8 0 0 2 
Vocational training (16–18 years) 18 18 19 21 42 25 
       
 
Female 
Primary or below (< 16 years) 69 67 2 0 9 39 
Secondary (16–18 years) 15 11 35 0 37 23 
University (19–22 years) 4 3 21 39 16 12 
Higher 1 3 9 0 0 2 
Vocational training (16–18 years) 11 16 33 61 38 25 
       
 
Total 
Primary or below (< 16 years) 55 53 2 0 6 24 
Secondary (16–18 years) 21 25 48 5 42 29 
University (19–22 years) 5 2 23 74 10 20 
Higher 1 2 8 0 0 2 
Vocational training (16–18 years) 18 18 19 21 42 25 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
Additional intra-regional differences appear when comparing land use. On average in 
Galicia and Asturias the share of farmland that is grassland and land cultivated with 
fodder is around 56% and 40%, respectively. In other regions, grassland represents 
less than 45% of all agricultural land, while the remaining agricultural land is allocated 
to fodder cultivation and non-dairy-related activities. 
It is quite uncommon for farmers in the studied regions to own agricultural land, 
except in Podlaskie, where about 70% of the sampled farmers own the land they use. 
In all of the other regions, more than 80% of land is rented. 
4.2 Milk production and types of milk buyer 
In the five studied regions, the production of cow’s milk follows the same general 
upward trend as at MS level. As Figure 6 shows, the level of milk production over the 
three different periods increased, albeit to different extents, in all five regions. 
Variations in regions’ production development reflect farming practices, market 
structure and development, as well as the level of integration along the dairy chain. 
The largest volume of milk produced from the five studied regions was in Normandie 
(763 million litres), followed by Bayern (455 million), Asturias (435 million), Galicia 
(381 million) and Podlaskie (153 million). The highest growth rate compared with 
10 years ago occurred in Asturias (59%), while Podlaskie grew less quickly, at 39%. 
On average across the five regions the milk delivered to dairies had increased by 50% 
in 2016 compared with 10 years ago. By comparison, the milk delivered to dairies rose 
by an average of 36% in 2006 compared with 2014 (pre-quota period). Galicia and 
Asturias saw deliveries of milk increase the most among the five studied regions 
during the same period: by 40% and 38%, respectively (Figure 7). 
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Figure 6. Milk production 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
Figure 7. Milk production growth 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of farmers’ milk deliveries by type of buyer in the five 
studied regions. In Galicia, Normandie, Bayern and Asturias, the majority of surveyed 
farmers delivered their milk to processing companies (73%, 62%, 57% and 52%, 
respectively), while in Podlaskie the majority of farmers (62%) delivered to collecting 
or processing cooperatives. Collecting or processing cooperatives were also important 
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buyers of farm milk in Normandie (26%) and Bayern (23%), while collective 
cooperative are the second most important buyers in Asturias (33%). In general, the 
type of main buyer has not changed over time in any of the five regions. 
Figure 8. Distribution of farmers’ milk deliveries to milk buyers in 2016 
(percentages of types of buyer) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
The concentration of milk buyers differs in each of the five studied regions. In Galicia, 
for instance, there were about 60 different buyers that had contractual arrangements 
with surveyed dairy farmers in 2016. The two main buyers purchased from only 15% 
and 11% of the surveyed farmers in this region. Similarly, the concentration of milk 
buyers is low in Bayern. In this region, there are more than 60 different buyers 
collecting milk and only two largest buyers collect from less than 10% of surveyed 
farmers. The main buyer in Bayern accounts for 7% of surveyed farmers. The 
distribution of farmers’ milk deliveries is more concentrated in Asturias, where the 
majority of surveyed farmers (67%) deliver the milk to one buyer, and the second 
main buyer accounts for about 16%. The majority of these farms are medium-sized 
holders (43%), while small farmers represent only 12% of those delivering to this 
company. In Normandie, the sector is relatively concentrated. The three main buyers 
collected milk from 68%, 45% and 33%, respectively, of surveyed farmers in the 
region. In Podlaskie, half of the surveyed dairy farmers deliver to the same buyer, 
while the remaining farmers are spread among another 16 buyers, the largest of 
which collects milk from 13% of all surveyed farmers. 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of milk delivered by farm size group, that is, small 
holders (farmers with 3–19 cows), medium holders (farmers with 20–99 cows) and 
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large holders (farmers with 100 or more cows). The boxplots10 for Asturias and Galicia 
show positive skews of deliveries for large farms, meaning that the quantities of milk 
delivered by those below the median are closer together than the quantities of those 
delivering higher quantities. In both cases, the 25 percentile is about 1,000,000 litres. 
However, in Asturias the deliveries are even more spread out, with farmers delivering 
up to 3,000,000 litres. In Normandie, Bayern and Podlaskie, there is no significant 
difference in milk quantity deliveries across the three classes. The central tendency 
(median values) ranges from 600,000 to 1,200,000 litres without significant variation 
across regions. 
Figure 9. Milk production by farm size 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
4.3 Milk prices 
Figure 10 shows the evolution of raw cow’s milk prices in MS covered by this study 
and at EU level for the period 1977–2016. The prices exhibit seasonal fluctuations, 
although in 2007 there was a visible increase. Fluctuations in milk prices increased 
after 2007. Milk prices in Poland gradually converged on the EU price level after the 
country’s accession to the EU in 2004. From 2008 to 2009, milk prices across the five 
EU MS showed a reverse downward trend. Milk prices went up again in the following 
periods, although the quota system was still in place. The elimination of dairy quotas 
in April 2015 coincided with a downward trend in milk prices. The fall in milk prices by 
36% between December 2013 and July 2016 was of a similar magnitude to that 
during the period January 2008 and May 2009, when prices fell by 37%. 
                                           
10 The box represented in the boxplot’s figure extends from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of milk 
production per farm. The 50th percentile (median) is drawn (with a horizontal line) inside the box. The 
whiskers above and below each box give additional information about the spread of the data; they represent 
the minimum and maximum values within a given farm size group. 
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The milk price developments at country level depicted in Figure 10 are in line with 
figures from our survey. Figure 11 shows the milk prices received by surveyed farmers 
in September 2006 (i.e. 10 years ago)11 and in September 2016. The average milk 
price in September 2006 varied between EUR 0.34 and EUR 0.38 per litre across the 
five studied regions, except for Podlaskie, where the average price was EUR 0.27. In 
September 2016 the average milk price in Galicia, Bayern and Normandie was 
approximately EUR 0.30 per litre, while in Asturias and Podlaskie the price was 
EUR 0.35 and EUR 0.32, respectively. For comparison, the milk prices at national level 
as reported in Figure 10 were EUR 0.30, EUR 0.27, EUR 0.31 and EUR 0.26 per litre12 
in Spain, Germany, France and Poland, respectively. 
On average, the milk price received by farmers had decreased in all regions by 
September 2016 compared with 10 years ago, with the exception of Podlaskie. Bayern 
and Galicia experienced the largest average milk price reduction during this period 
(EUR 0.07 and EUR 0.08 per litre, respectively) compared with the other regions. On 
the other hand, in Podlaskie, the milk price received by farmers had increased by 
September 2016 compared with 10 years ago. On average, the price received by 
surveyed farmers in Podlaskie in September 2016 was almost EUR 0.06 per litre 
higher than 10 years ago. In addition, price differences in Podlaskie were much more 
spread out than in other regions (Figure 11). 
 
                                           
11 Note that information on milk prices received in 2006 was reported by only around one third of surveyed 
farmers. 
12 We used a conversion rate of 1.03 kilograms/litre to convert the national milk prices reported in Figure 10 
from per kilogram to per litre. 
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Figure 10. Historical evolution of EU raw cow’s milk prices (cents per 1 kg, 1977–2016) 
 
Source: EU Milk Market Observatory, Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, European Commission. 
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Figure 11. Milk prices across the surveyed regions (cents per litre, 2006 and 
2016) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
4.4 Farmers’ business relationship with the main milk buyer 
With the exception of farmers in Galicia, more than half of surveyed farmers in the 
studied regions declared a business relationship with their main milk buyer of more than 
20 years’ standing. This was particularly true in Asturias, where more than two fifths of 
the overall sample had a long-term relationship (more than 20 years) with their main 
milk buyer. By contrast, in Galicia only 30% of sampled farmers reported a similarly long 
relationship with their main milk buyer. Of these farmers, 22% had a long relationship 
with the two largest milk buyers in the region; of the remaining farmers, 43% stated that 
they had had a relationship with the same buyer for less than 20 years but more than 
5 years, and 27% declared that they had started a relationship with the main buyer only 
recently. In Asturias, 40% of interviewed farmers had a long-term relationship with the 
two largest buyers in the region, and in Normandie 17% had one with the three largest 
milk buyers, while in Podlaskie 28% of surveyed farmers had a long relationship with the 
two largest buyers. However, this pattern was not observed in Bayern, where farmers’ 
long-term business relationships were spread among different milk buyers operating in 
the region.  
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the distance of surveyed farmers from the main buyer 
in 2016.13 The thickness of the outer shape indicates the frequency of the result. 
According to the figure, farmers in Galicia and Normandie tend to be located further from 
the main buyer than farmers in the other three regions. Around 57% and 55% of the 
                                           
13 The circles (indicating the mean) and the bold vertical line (indicating the distance between the mean and the 
median) are shifted up in Bayern and Podlaskie compared with Galicia and Normandie. For the former two 
regions, this means that the mean distance is greater than the median. For Asturias, the bold vertical line is not 
shown because in this case the mean is similar to the median. 
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surveyed farmers are located more than 50 km from their main buyer in Normandie and 
Galicia, respectively. The distance of the rest of farmers in these two regions is less than 
50 km. In Asturias, the vast majority of farmers (71%) are between 10 and 50 km from 
their main buyers. In Bayern and Podlaskie, more than half of producers are located 
between 10 and 50 km away. 
Figure 12. Distribution of the distance of surveyed farmers from their main 
buyer (2016) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
Note: The marker indicates the median of the data, the box indicates the interquartile range (IQR), and 
the spikes extend to the upper- and lower-adjacent values (i.e. the largest and smallest observation that 
is lower/greater than or equal to the upper/lower quartile ±1.5 × IQR). 
 
On average, only 24% of the surveyed farmers across all five study regions considered 
changing their main buyer. There are, however, substantial differences between regions. 
Whereas in Asturias and Podlaskie about 13% and 3% of dairy farmers respectively 
would prefer to have a different main buyer from their current one, in Galicia and Bayern 
this rises to around 40%. In Normandie, this figure is close to the total sample average, 
at 26%. 
Table 12 lists a number of barriers faced by surveyed farmers who considered changing 
their main buyer. That is, the table reports the results for 24% of surveyed farmers 
across all five study regions. Although Galicia has a relatively large number of buyers, 
the majority of them are located more than 50 km from surveyed farmers. This is 
perceived as a constraint on changing the main buyer (i.e. there is a lack of other dairies 
in the neighbourhood) by 46% of surveyed farmers. The main barrier (60%) in Asturias 
is the difficulty of obtaining better conditions with new buyers, which may be caused by a 
market structure that means that there is a relatively high concentration of milk buyers. 
Other important barriers in Asturias are the requirement to become a member of a new 
cooperative/producer organization and the possibility that other buyers might not be 
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willing to purchase all the milk that farmers want to sell. One interesting result occurs in 
Normandie, where the majority of farmers considering changing their main buyer (i.e. 
27% of those surveyed) found the written contract to be the main obstacle (i.e. 75% of 
surveyed farmers who considered changing buyer). This is also reported as an important 
barrier in Bayern (48%) and, to a lesser extent, in Asturias and Podlaskie (about 33%). 
In Bayern, the written contract and the requirement to become a member of a new 
cooperative/producer organization are equally discouraging to farmers who want to 
change the main buyer, similarly to the situation in Asturias. In Podlaskie, where only 
3% of the surveyed farmers said that they were considering a change of buyer, the risk 
posed by cooperating with a new dairy buyer was cited as an important obstacle. 
 
Table 12. Barriers to changing the main milk buyer (% of surveyed farmers who 
considered changing buyer) 
  Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie 
1: Written contract 26.5 33.2 74.9 48.0 33.8 
2: Lack of other dairies in the neighbourhood 45.8 21.2 39.7 23.7 5.1 
3: Membership shares would be paid with (long) delay 32.2 26.9 4.3 23.4 1.9 
4: I would not get such good conditions anywhere else 37.7 59.7 48.2 30.4 26.8 
5: I have credit from the dairy 2.6 6.4 0.3 0.0 4.2 
6: I have credit from a bank which is guaranteed by the 
dairy 
0.6 4.5 0.3 0.0 3.0 
7: Risk of cooperation with a new dairy 37.4 30.2 8.1 22.5 30.6 
8: Higher milk quality requirements 16.7 6.8 26.9 10.9 6.6 
9: The dairy is too far from my farm 16.4 9.1 18.5 17.1 8.7 
10: Other dairies do not collect milk from the farm 16.0 36.3 31.6 12.6 1.8 
11: I would be required to build a new business network 
with a local partner 
10.2 38.4 34.6 20.1 26.5 
12: I would need to become a member of a new 
cooperative/producer organization 
18.2 55.2 26.8 48.1 27.6 
13: Other dairies are not reliable 31.8 23.8 13.9 3.7 1.8 
14: Other dairies are not willing to collect all my milk  19.4 43.5 10.0 5.8 0.5 
15: There are other support measures – I would have to 
account for them 
26.1 21.4 1.6 0.0 22.7 
16: Other  16.8 30.3 2.1 6.3 0.0 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
Because the majority of farmers are not concerned about changing their buyer, it is 
interesting to look at the factors that tie dairy farmers to their main buyer. Figure 13 lists 
the most important reasons why farmers maintain their relationship with the main buyer. 
Farmers were asked to rank the 3 most important reasons from 12 options.14 There is 
relatively high homogeneity among the surveyed regions, with either price level or price 
stability reported to be the most important reason for maintaining the relationship. These 
two reasons were selected by 30% and 23% of all surveyed farmers, respectively. These 
were followed by the constancy of milk collection and the assurance that all the milk will 
be collected by the buyer, which were chosen by 17% and 15% of all surveyed farmers, 
respectively. 
                                           
14 Note that Figure 13 does not include two reasons for maintaining the relationship with the main buyer – 
training needs and assistance programmes (e.g. credit, inputs) – because none of the surveyed farmers 
selected these as important. 
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Figure 13. First and most important reasons for maintaining the relationship 
with the main milk buyer (% of surveyed farmers) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
5. Contractual arrangements 
A written contract regulates the relationship between commercial partners by 
establishing conditions under which a product, in this case milk, will be delivered (e.g. 
price, quality) during the contract. The specification of a large number of provisions and 
contingencies in the contract brings a number of advantages, such as the avoidance of 
potential disputes or misunderstandings regarding delivery terms during contract 
execution. However, because of uncertainty about the future or unobservable and 
unverifiable actions, not all events can be anticipated, which is why many contracts are 
incomplete and postpone the resolution of unforeseen situations (e.g. disputes) until a 
later date. 
The vast majority of surveyed farms in the study regions have a written contract with the 
main buyer, either as an individual contract (55% of all surveyed farmers) or with a 
cooperative or producer organization (26% of surveyed farmers). The exception is 
Asturias, where most farmers have informal contractual arrangements. Although here the 
use of informal arrangements has reduced over time (i.e. compared with 10 years ago), 
76% of surveyed farmers still do not have formal contract with their main buyer. In 
Bayern, many farmers (69%) have a contract with a cooperative/producer organization 
rather than individual contracts, which are common in Podlaskie, Galicia and Normandie 
(Table 13). It is worth noting that in Galicia 70% of farmers declared that they had a 
different type of contract in each of the three periods covered in the survey (i.e. 2016, 
2014 and 10 years ago), while in Podlaskie 79% of farmers reported no change in the 
type of contract across the three periods. 
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Table 13. Type of contract surveyed farmers have with their main buyer (% of 
surveyed farmers) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
Table 14 and Table 15 attempt to measure the completeness of farmers’ contracts with 
the main buyer by providing statistics on the number of elements of milk delivery 
arrangements explicitly specified in the written contract. Of a total of 18 elements, on 
average contracts explicitly specify around five different milk delivery arrangements 
across the five regions, namely 6.9 elements in Galicia, 6.2 in Normandie, 6 in Bayern, 
4.4 in Asturias and 3.7 in Podlaskie (Table 14). The most common elements specified are 
milk quality testing (67% of surveyed farmers with a written contract), duration of 
contract (64%), milk price (63%), timing of payments (59%) and premiums for higher 
milk quality (58%). The rest of the elements are included in written contracts for fewer 
than 50% of all surveyed farmers who have one (Table 15). 
Unlike in other regions, contracts in Normandie are generally extended automatically 
(80% of surveyed farmers with a written contract). In this region, almost all farmers with 
a written contract have a milk quality testing arrangement specified in the contract 
(90%). Furthermore, it is common in Normandie for the contract duration and the timing 
of payments to be set (this is true for around four fifths of farmers with a written 
contract). Discretion of the buyer in refusing or adjusting milk delivery is quite limited in 
all five regions (between 7% and 30% of surveyed farmers with a written contract), but 
it is more common than the option for farmers to exercise the same right (between 2% 
and 22%). Similarly, penalties if farmers fail to deliver are more frequently specified in 
written contracts (between 11% and 54% of surveyed farmers with a written contract) 
than safeguards if the buyer fails to fulfil the contract terms (between 0% and 15%). 
Regarding contract cancellation terms, in total 38% of farmers with a written contract 
have these specified in their contract, mainly in Bayern, Normandie and Podlaskie (Table 
15). 
Table 14. Average number of elements set in the contract with the main buyer  
Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie   Total 
Average number of 
elements set in the contract 
(out of a total of 18) 
6.9 4.4 6.2 6 3.7  5.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
 
2016 2016 2016 2016 2016
Individual contract 70.2 406% 13.6 56% 46.5 158% 22.1 14% 75.1 2%
Contract with 
cooperative/producer 
organization 17.8 91.0% 8.9 48% 14.1 1463% 69.0 -5% 21.8 -2%
Both  individual contract and       
with coop/producer 
organization 1.7 115% 1.8 147% 19.3 414% 3.6 - 0% 0.8 -14%
Oral agreement 2.6 -92% 1.5 -77% 3.9 -57% 1.6 14% 0.8 - -47%
No contract 7.7 -83% 74.1 -5% 16.3 -76% 3.8 18% 1.5 -14%
Δ 2016- 10 
years ago
Δ 2016- 10 
years ago
Δ 2016- 10 
years ago
Δ 2016- 10 
years ago
Δ 2016- 10 
years ago
Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie
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Table 15. Milk delivery arrangements set in the contract with the main buyer 
(% of surveyed farmers with a written contract, N = 1114) 
Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie   Total 
1. Duration 85.9 50.3 82.2 67.1 29.3   64.1 
2. Automatic extension 18.5 24.7 79.8 51.7 45.1 
 
42.1 
3. Milk price 93.0 63.2 47.9 21.0 60.7 
 
62.7 
4. Premiums for higher milk quality 87.7 74.4 40.4 42.9 40.9 
 
57.9 
5. Timing of payments 60.8 22.1 76.0 72.3 43.1 
 
59.0 
6. Milk quantity is defined in the 
contract 
69.8 36.0 54.1 9.1 18.9 
 
40.4 
7. Penalties if farmer fails to deliver 
54.2 20.8 43.2 29.4 10.9 
 
34.2 
8. Buyer can refuse or adjust milk 
delivery 
25.9 18.9 11.2 29.5 6.6 
 
18.3 
9. You (or farm 
organization/cooperative) can 
refuse or adjust milk delivery 
conditions 
9.9 4.1 2.0 22.4 1.8 
 
8.3 
10. Dispute resolution mechanism 13.3 7.3 20.8 23.7 18.9 
 
17.9 
11. Obligation to invest in dairy 
production 
1.7 0.0 0.8 2.0 1.3 
 
1.4 
12. Imposition of marketing/supply 
constraints 
6.7 2.8 41.2 21.2 0.8 
 
12.8 
13. Milk quality testing 74.9 31.8 90.0 67.7 47.3 
 
66.7 
14. Safeguard if the buyer fails to 
fulfil contract terms 
13.9 0.0 11.0 14.6 5.4 
 
10.7 
15. Terms for contract cancellation 26.3 9.6 41.0 59.3 37.4 
 
37.5 
16. Consultancy services 7.7 11.0 4.4 25.3 5.5 
 
9.8 
17. Direct or indirect funding 2.9 14.2 0.6 4.1 1.0 
 
2.5 
18. Sanitary and veterinary services 12.3 23.5 1.1 29.9 2.2   10.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
 
Figure 14 shows the duration of contracts in the five surveyed regions for two periods, 
2006 and 2016. The lower and upper edges of the boxes in the figure represent the 
minimum and maximum duration of contracts, respectively. The horizontal lines express 
the mean duration. The solid bars show one standard deviation of the contract duration 
from the mean. The figure also compares two periods: 2016 (dark blue) and 10 years 
ago (light blue). The average duration of a contract in 2016 was 58 months in 
Normandie, 30 months in Bayern, 14 months in Podlaskie, and 9 months in Asturias and 
Galicia. Compared with 10 years ago, in 2016 contracts were significantly shorter in 
Galicia and Asturias (by 4 and 18 months, respectively), while in Normandie they were 
8 months longer. By contrast, in Bayern and Podlaskie no significant changes were 
observed in contract duration over time. We observe that in Asturias, Bayern and 
Podlaskie (although in Podlaskie the variation is relatively small) the distribution tends to 
be skewed towards contracts longer than the average. In Normandie, the reverse is true: 
the distribution is slightly skewed towards contracts shorter than the average. 
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Figure 14. Duration of the contract with the main buyer (number of months) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
Notes: The boxes show the minimum and maximum duration of the contract, while the horizontal line shows 
the mean duration. The solid bars correspond to one standard deviation from the mean. The dark blue colour 
corresponds to 2016 and the light blue to 10 years ago. 
Differences in contract duration between farm size classes are relatively significant. In 
2016, the average duration of contracts for small farmers was 14 months across all five 
study regions. The longest contract for small farmers was 55 months. Medium-sized 
farmers had on average a contract of 18 months, with a range from 1 month to 
120 months. In contrast, the average contract duration for large farmers was 41 months. 
Asturias is the only region where we observed the opposite difference in contract length 
between small and large farms. In this region, small farmers have established long 
relationships with their main purchasers. On average, small farmers have contracts that 
last for about 2 years, as opposed to medium and larger farmers, who set up contracts 
for less than 1 year. 
Another key element of written contracts is milk price. However, the way that milk price 
is established varies across regions. In principle, price can be defined as fixed or by a 
predefined formula. It can also be undefined, meaning that it is negotiated during 
contract execution. As reported in Table 16, milk price is rarely fixed, with the exception 
of Galicia, where a substantial share of farmers with a written contract (31%) have their 
milk price fixed. In Normandie, Bayern and Podlaskie, prices vary based on a predefined 
formula – for 60%, 59% and 58% of surveyed farmers with a written contract, 
respectively – while in a significant share of contracts in Galicia the price is either set on 
the basis of milk quality (55%) or set unilaterally by the buyer (50%).15 In Asturias, the 
quality and quantity of milk delivered is a significant determinant of the price set in the 
contract (46%); furthermore, in 40% of cases the price is set unilaterally by the buyer. 
In Bayern, a significant share of farmers (45%) have prices negotiated during the 
contract. Compared with 10 years ago there are no significant differences in how prices 
are established, with the exception of price quality, which seems a much more 
predominant factor in 2016 than it was 10 years ago. 
                                           
15 Note that in some cases price is set based on multiple criteria such as quality, spot price and quantity. As a 
result, the sum of all components reported in Table 16 is not 100%. 
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Table 16. Milk price setting across regions with the main buyer (% of surveyed 
farmers with a written contract) 
  Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie Total 
Price is fixed 30.6 9.4 1.1 15.4 1.6 17.2 
Price is variable based on predefined formula 28.9 25.6 60.3 58.6 57.9 42.8 
Price is based on spot market 34.3 45.9 41.9 5.8 7.0 25.8 
Price is based on production costs 4.0 4.4 8.1 1.9 1.5 3.7 
Price is based on delivered quality 54.9 45.5 26.6 55.7 14.3 39.5 
Price is based on delivered quantity 29.7 45.5 15.5 21.1 29.2 27.7 
Price is negotiated during contract execution 8.1 6.5 9.2 45.1 1.0 8.3 
Price is set unilaterally by the buyer 49.7 40.4 3.0 8.7 12.5 30.6 
Price is set unilaterally by the farmer 1.1 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.8 
Other 0.9 13.0 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.9 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
The most common parameter for price setting is protein content (36%), followed by fat 
content (30%), somatic cells (21%) and bacteria (12%) (Figure 15).16 However, as 
shown in Figure 15, these parameters are not equally important in all five surveyed 
regions. For instance, whereas in Bayern and Normandie protein content is the most 
important parameter for price setting – for more than half of farmers with a written 
contract – in Podlaskie it is fat content. On the other hand, somatic cells are the main 
parameter in Asturias. In contrast, in Galicia there is no dominant parameter for milk 
price setting. 
Figure 15. Parameters for price setting with the main buyer (% of surveyed 
farmers with price set in the contract) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
                                           
16 The percentages in Figure 15 were calculated on the basis of the total number of farmers with a 
written contract and prices set in the contract, that is 63% of all surveyed farmers across all 
surveyed regions. 
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Figure 16 shows the different ways in which milk quantity is set in the contract.17 In most 
cases, quantity is fully variable based on attained production. However, this does not 
appear to be the standard rule in Normandie, where almost 35% of farmers have the 
minimum and maximum quantities set in their contract. Similarly, in Galicia either 
minimum and maximum quantities or minimum quantity only are established in the 
majority of contracts. In Bayern, the quantity is fully variable in most cases; however, for 
about 10% of farmers with a contract the way in which quantity is set is not specified. 
Figure 16. Contractual setting of milk quantity with the main buyer (% of 
surveyed farmers with quantity set in the contract) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
Most contracts (67% of all surveyed farmers) establish who is in charge of conducting 
quality testing of delivered milk. The testing is done mainly by the buyers in the two 
Spanish regions, in the case of more than 60% of surveyed farmers with milk quality 
testing specified in their contract. This aspect is particularly important in Podlaskie, 
where, for 82% of farmers who have milk quality testing specified in their contract, the 
testing is done exclusively by the buyer. The situation is different in Normandie and 
Bayern, where, for 85% and 65% of farmers, respectively, their milk deliveries are 
subject to third-party quality testing (Figure 17). 
 
                                           
17 Farmers with quantity set in the contract constitute 40% of all farmers across the five regions. 
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Figure 17. Milk quality testing arrangements with the main buyer (% of 
surveyed farmers with milk quality testing specified in the contract) 
 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
5.1 Contract negotiation 
Contract negotiation is the process through which parties agree on contractual terms. 
Factors such as bargaining power, asymmetric information, transaction costs, tolerance 
of risk and the potential for moral hazard determine the negotiation strategy. For 
example, a player with bargaining power might be able to impose contract terms rather 
than negotiate them with the trading partner. 
The survey results show that about 30% of farmers negotiate the contract with the main 
buyer. This figure varies across regions and over time. Among the study regions, the 
largest shares of farmers who negotiated the contract with the main buyer in 2016 were 
reported in Bayern and Galicia (around 43% of cases in each region), followed by 
Asturias (30%), Normandie (19%) and Podlaskie (15%). There was no substantial 
difference in the contract negotiation pattern between 2014 and 2016. It seems that in 
Asturias farmers have lost the negotiating power that they had 10 years ago. In contrast, 
in Normandie this power had increased in 2016 compared with 10 years ago (Table 17). 
In Podlaskie, almost all farmers who reported that they had negotiated the contract in 
2016 stated that they had negotiated it by themselves. In Galicia and Asturias, 65% and 
90% of the farmers were able to negotiate the contract with the main buyer by 
themselves. In Bayern, the majority of surveyed farmers who negotiated the contract did 
so through a cooperative or producer organization (84%). Collective negotiation also 
occurred in Galicia and Normandie, representing between 26% and 66% of the farmers 
who negotiated their contract. We did not observe significant changes in the negotiation 
pattern over time, except in Asturias, where there has been a shift from individual 
negotiation towards collective negotiation (cooperative or producer organization). A small 
shift had occurred in Podlaskie, where the share of farmers with individual negotiation 
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had increased from 91% 10 years ago to 98% in 2016. The role of cooperative or 
producer organizations in contract negotiation remains unimportant in Podlaskie (Table 
18). 
Table 17. Share of farmers who negotiated contract terms with the main buyer 
(% of surveyed farmers with a written contract) 
    Share of farmers with a written contract (%) Standard error 95% confidence interval 
2016 
Galicia 43.1 3.4 36.5 49.9 
Asturias 28.8 9.9 13.5 51.1 
Normandie 18.9 5.2 10.7 31.3 
Bayern 43.0 3.5 36.2 50.0 
Podlaskie 15.4 2.2 11.6 20.1 
 Total 30.7 1.7 27.5 34.1 
 
    
2014 
Galicia 41.8 3.4 35.3 48.7 
Asturias 29.9 10.0 14.3 52.1 
Normandie 6.4 3.3 2.3 16.6 
Bayern 42.1 3.5 35.4 49.2 
Podlaskie 15.4 2.2 11.6 20.1 
 Total 29.2 1.6 26.1 32.6 
     
10 
years 
ago  
Galicia 44.5 3.4 37.9 51.4 
Asturias 40.1 10.7 21.8 61.7 
Normandie 6.4 3.3 2.3 16.6 
Bayern 43.1 3.5 36.4 50.2 
Podlaskie 12.4 2.0 9.0 16.8 
 Total 29.4 1.6 26.3 32.8 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
Table 18. Actors that negotiated the farmer’s contract with the main buyer (% 
of surveyed farmers who negotiated the contract) 
  Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie Total 
2016 
Negotiated by me 65.7 90.0 32.0 6.0 98.4 52.7 
Negotiated through a cooperative/producer 
organization 
26.1 10.0 66.0 84.3 0.0 41.1 
Negotiated by me and through a 
cooperative/producer organization 
8.2 0.0 2.0 9.6 1.6 6.2 
 
2014 
Negotiated by me 61.1 80.0 34.9 7.3 98.3 51.1 
Negotiated through a cooperative/producer 
organization 
28.6 10.0 65.1 82.9 0.0 41.7 
Negotiated by me and through a 
cooperative/producer organization 
10.3 10.0 0.0 9.8 1.7 7.2 
 
10 years ago 
Negotiated by me 69.2 77.8 75.0 8.2 91.4 51.3 
Negotiated through a cooperative/producer 
organization 
19.8 11.1 25.0 82.4 5.7 40.3 
Negotiated by me and through a 
cooperative/producer organization 
11.0 11.1 0.0 9.4 2.9 8.5 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
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The survey results indicate that the negotiation process can take a relatively long time. 
In the five study regions, we observed both geographical and temporal variation in the 
negotiation duration. As reported above, only a small share of surveyed farmers have the 
option to negotiate their contract, that is, 31% of the whole sample with a written 
contract. The average duration of contract negotiation among these farmers was 
25 days. In Galicia and Podlaskie, contracts are negotiated in a relatively short time 
compared with other regions. On average in these two regions the negation is completed 
within 3–5 days, while in Asturias this takes a bit longer, around 10 days. In Normandie 
and Bayern, contract negotiation generally takes longer and can last up to 3 months. In 
general, the duration of contract negotiation is longer for large farmers (on average 
45 days) than for medium and small farmers who, on average, conclude their 
negotiations in 17 and 20 days, respectively, although there are wide variations across 
regions. 
Compared with 10 years ago, 40% of farmers perceived that they had weaker 
negotiating power vis-à-vis their main dairy buyer, whereas 41% of all surveyed farmers 
responded that they were more or less in the same position. The majority of those who 
reported having weaker negotiating power across all five study regions were from Galicia 
(56%). Only 9% of all surveyed farmers said that their negotiating power was stronger 
than it had been 10 years ago. The majority of these farmers were from Galicia (40%) 
and Bayern (35%). 
The main reasons for changes in farmers’ negotiating power in relation to the main buyer 
in 2016 compared with 10 years ago include the smaller number of dairy buyers to whom 
farmers can deliver milk and the change in the number of dairy farms in the region 
(Figure 18). On the other hand, there is no clearly dominant reason for farmers reporting 
stronger negotiating power during the same period, although greater effectiveness of 
cooperatives or producer organizations was reported more frequently than other reasons 
(Figure 18). 
Figure 18. Reasons for changes in farmers’ negotiating power in relation to 
their main buyer in 2016 compared with 10 years ago (number of surveyed 
farmers) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on survey data. 
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Although around 31% of all surveyed farmers negotiated their contract with the main 
buyer in 2016 (Table 17), farmers’ responses suggest that not all elements included in 
the contract were negotiated. Table 19 summarises the contract terms that were 
included in the contract and negotiated with the main buyer in 2016. The most commonly 
negotiated contract terms are milk price, contract duration, premiums for higher milk 
quality and timing of payments. By contrast, some terms, such as safeguards if the buyer 
fails to fulfil the contract, the dispute resolution mechanism, the option for the buyer to 
refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions and the imposition of marketing or supply 
constraints on farmers, are not usually negotiated, although they are included in the 
contract. These results are largely similar to those reported for 10 years ago, although 
some inter-regional differences emerge during this period (not reported in Table 19). 
Table 19. Contract terms negotiated with the main buyer in 2016 (% of 
surveyed farmers with a given element included in the contract) 
  Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie Total 
Duration 72.0 79.0 38.4 79.4 26.0   61.6 
Automatic extension 12.2 34.9 17.1 26.0 28.7 20.0 
Milk price 95.1 82.7 50.4 47.8 79.7 74.3 
Premiums for higher milk quality 81.1 81.7 18.4 45.7 31.6 55.4 
Timing of payments 56.2 40.9 3.1 52.9 24.4 42.6 
Milk quantity is defined in the contract 53.4 62.8 59.1 5.7 15.3 35.4 
Penalties if I fail to deliver under contract terms 27.5 32.9 16.3 14.1 4.9 18.8 
Buyer can refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions 11.7 19.9 0.0 14.1 3.3 9.6 
You (or farm organization/cooperative) can refuse 
or adjust milk delivery conditions 4.4 0.0 0.5 11.3 2.2 5.1 
Dispute resolution mechanism 5.8 0.0 4.4 14.8 17.1 9.8 
Obligation to invest in dairy production 4.3 0.0 0.9 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Imposition of marketing/supply constraints 3.8 0.0 2.0 9.9 0.0 4.4 
Milk quality testing 37.5 19.9 18.7 40.5 18.1 31.9 
Safeguard if the buyer fails to fulfil the contract 8.4 0.0 0.5 9.9 1.1 6.2 
Terms for contract cancellation 5.2 19.9 2.7 32.6 19.5 14.9 
Consultancy 5.0 0.0 1.0 14.4 0.0 5.8 
Direct or indirect funding 3.4 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 1.8 
Sanitary and veterinary services 5.9 8.0 0.5 11.7 0.0   5.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
Farmers unable to negotiate contractual arrangements (around 69% all surveyed farmers 
with a written contract) reported that the main reasons for this were (i) arrangements 
were determined by market standards (39% of surveyed farmers who did not negotiate 
the contract terms), (ii) arrangements were imposed by the buyer (“take it or leave it”) 
(54%) and (iii) other (12%). In Galicia, Normandie and Podlaskie the option “take it or 
leave it” is quite a common reason for not negotiating contract terms. This practice 
affects 87%, 48% and 42% of farmers in these regions, respectively. Compared with 
10 years ago, the option “take or leave it” is more common, particularly in Galicia and 
Normandie. In general, the imposition of contractual arrangements by the buyer is more 
often exercised towards small farmers than towards large ones in the study regions. 
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6. The incidence of unfair trading practices 
This section presents the incidence of UTPs in the contract and at different stages of 
contract development (i.e. during contract execution and after contract finalization) 
among dairy farmers in the five studied regions. Note that the UTPs reported in this 
section are those perceived by dairy farmers with respect to their main milk buyer. The 
survey data show that dairy farmers might encounter as many as 17 different UTPs with 
their main milk buyer. The identified UTPs are described in Table 20. 
The UTPs can be embodied in the contract content if it provides better business terms for 
the buyer than for the dairy farmer or if it imposes certain trading restrictions on dairy 
farms. For example, UTPs identified in contract content include one-sided clauses that 
specify more favourable conditions for the buyer than for the dairy farmer (e.g. the buyer 
can refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions, there is no safeguard defined if the buyer 
fails to fulfil the contract, the buyer has better contract cancellation terms), practices 
that impose supply constraints, requirements to undertake specific investments and 
prices set unilaterally by the buyer. 
UTPs during contract execution include not respecting contract terms, delaying 
payments, unilaterally changing contract terms, refusing to accept milk deliveries and 
imposing additional fees/deductions. UTPs identified after contract finalization include 
cancelling the contract unilaterally before expiration and the “fear factor”. 
Table 20. List of UTPs considered 
UTPs in the contract content 
Buyer can refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions  
Imposition of marketing/supply constraints 
No protection for farmer if the buyer fails to fulfil the contract  
Buyer has better contract cancellation terms than farmer 
Imposed dairy-specific investment in the past 10 years 
Price is set unilaterally by the buyer 
 
UTPs during contract execution 
Dairy paid lower price than contracted  
Dairy did not collect milk or refused to accept milk delivery 
Dairy paid only after a delay  
Dairy required milk quality or quantity different from that agreed 
Dairy imposed additional fees/deductions  
The price was changed unilaterally by the buyer 
The required quality was changed unilaterally by the buyer 
The required quantity was changed unilaterally by the buyer 
Buyer changed other terms of contract (e.g. credit, information provision, milk collection) 
UTPs after contract finalization 
Contract was ended by the buyer unilaterally before expiration 
Fear factor 
Source: Created by the authors based on survey data. 
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6.1 Unfair trading practices in the contract content 
The survey data show that UTPs in the contract content are relatively common. Overall, 
96% of surveyed farmers reported at least one UTP in their contract with the main buyer. 
Across the five studied regions, the share of farmers with at least one UTP varied 
between 91% in Bayern and 100% in Asturias (Table 21). 
The most common UTP in the contract content is “no safeguard defined if the buyer fails 
to fulfil the contract”, followed by “price is set unilaterally by the buyer”, “dairy-specific 
investment required” and “buyer can refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions”, which 
were reported by 89%, 19%, 18% and 12%, respectively, of surveyed dairy farmers with 
a written contract across all five study regions. The prevalence of UTPs is largely similar 
across the five study regions. In Asturias, two out of the six UTPs seem not to affect 
farmers, while in Galicia the buyer’s ability to unilaterally change price is more common 
than in other regions. The imposition of dairy-specific investments affects mainly farmers 
in Normandie and Bayern. In Normandie, 22% of farmers with a written contract claim 
that the buyer has better contract cancellation terms, which is the highest figure among 
the five regions. The incidence of the remaining UTPs is less pronounced, with the 
exception of “imposition of marketing/supply constraints”, which 32% of surveyed farms 
in Normandie reported (Table 21). 
Table 21. UTPs in the contract content (% of respondents with a written 
contract) 
UTPs in the contract 
Galicia 
(365) 
Asturia
s (25) 
Normandie 
(173) 
Bayern 
(194) 
Podlaskie 
(329) 
Total 
  % 
Buyer can refuse or adjust milk delivery 
conditions  
17.8 15.8 10.0 12.1 5.9 11.9 
Imposition of marketing/supply constraints 5.5 2.9 31.8 1.0 0.4 7.1 
No protection for farmer if the buyer fails to fulfil 
the contract  
85.7 100.0 88.4 85.1 94.6 89.1 
Buyer has better contract cancellation terms 
than farmer 
11.3 0.0 21.6 1.9 7.1 9.6 
Imposed dairy-specific investment in the last 
10 years 
10.7 0.0 32.1 37.6 8.2 17.8 
Price set unilaterally by the buyer 46.9 27.1 1.2 1.9 7.6 19.4 
       
At least one UTP 96.3 100.0 99.6 90.7 97.1 96.1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
6.2 Unfair trading practices during contract execution and after contract 
finalization 
According to the survey results, around 60% of surveyed farmers reported having a 
rather good relationship with their main buyer, while 15% reported having a very good 
one. This is reflected in the relatively low incidence of UTPs during contract execution and 
after contract finalization. However, the UTPs reported by farmers are those experienced 
in one year (in 2016), indicating that their incidence may be greater if accumulated 
across several years. 
Overall, across all five regions, only around 9% of surveyed farmers with a written 
contract reported at least one UTP during contract execution and after contract 
finalization. Galicia had the largest share of farmers reporting at least one UTP during 
contract execution and after contract finalization (18% of surveyed farms with a written 
contract), followed by Asturias (9%), Bayern (7%) and Normandie (6%). Podlaskie had 
the smallest share (1%) (Table 22). 
46 
The fear factor represents the most common UTP, with around 4% of farmers with a 
written contract reporting this across all five regions. Its incidence varies substantially 
among regions: Galicia has the highest figure, at 8%, followed by Asturias (4%), 
Normandie (2%) and Bayern (2%). This UTP seems not to be a problem in Podlaskie. The 
low incidence of UTPs after contract expiration is likely to be because the majority of 
surveyed farmers (77%) had an active contract during the period covered (2016) (Table 
22). 
Unilateral change of price by the buyer appears to be the second most important UTP 
among farmers as shown in Table 22. Around 3% of farmers with a written contract 
reported this UTP across all five study regions. In Galicia and Asturias, the share of 
farmers affected is the highest among the five study regions, albeit relatively low, at 6% 
and 4% of farmers with a written contract, respectively. In Bayern, unilateral change in 
the required quality of milk deliveries seems to be the most common UTP (around 3% of 
surveyed farmers) (Table 22). 
The incidence of the other UTPs listed in Table 22 is around 2% or less of surveyed 
farmers across all five regions. For example, only around 1% of farmers with a written 
contract have experienced buyers unilaterally changing the required quality or quantity of 
delivered milk. The same is true for the buyer ending the contract unilaterally before 
expiration. For the rest of the UTPs in Table 22 the incidence is less than 0.5%. 
It is interesting to note that 20% of surveyed farmers with a written contract had the 
contract terminated after its expiration in 2016. Independently of the form of contract 
termination, 83% of farmers who had the contract terminated signed a new one with the 
same buyer, 13% signed a contract with a new buyer and 4% were not able to sign a 
new contract. For the majority of farmers who signed a new contract, this led to changes 
in contract terms. Only 13% of farmers who signed a new contract with the same buyer 
maintained the same terms as in the previous contract, while only 8% of farmers who 
signed a new contract with a different buyer maintained the same conditions. The 
contract terms that were most commonly changed were price (75%) and the required 
quality and quality of milk (35%). Less frequently changed contract terms were the 
requirement to invest in dairy activities and others (i.e. credit, milk collection, etc.) 
(1%). 
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Table 22. UTPs during contract execution and after contract finalization in 2016 
(% of respondents with a written contract) 
UTPs Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie Total 
  % 
UTPs during contract execution       
Dairy paid lower price than contracted  1.3 
    
0.4 
Dairy did not collect milk or refused to 
accept milk delivery 
0.3 
 
0.1 
  
0.1 
Dairy paid only after a delay  0.2 
 
0.5 
  
0.1 
Dairy required milk quality or quantity 
different than that agreed 
0.5 
    
0.2 
Dairy imposed additional 
fees/deductions  
0.9 
    
0.3 
The price was changed unilaterally by 
the buyer 
6.4 4.4 
 
1.7 0.4 2.7 
The required quality was changed 
unilaterally by the buyer 
1.9 
  
3.4 
 
1.2 
The required quantity was changed 
unilaterally by the buyer 
3.0 
 
3.4 
  
1.5 
Buyer changed other terms of contract 
(e.g. credit, information provision, milk 
collection) 
   1.7  0.3 
UTPs after contract finalization       
Contract was ended by buyer unilaterally 
before expiration 
2.2   1.6 0.7 1.2 
Fear factor 8.2 4.4 2.2 1.6  3.5 
       
At least one UTP 17.6 8.7 5.7 7.1 1.1 8.6 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
6.3 Overall incidence of unfair trading practices 
Table 23 summarises the incidence of UTPs across the regions by presenting the share of 
dairy farmers reporting a certain number of UTPs at any stage of the contractual 
relationship (i.e. in the contract content, during contract execution or after contract 
finalization). Overall, 98% of surveyed farmers with a written contract reported at least 
one UTP out of 17, whereas 54% of surveyed farmers with a written contract reported at 
least two UTPs, 30% at least three UTPs and 19% at least four UTPs. Few dairy farmers 
reported more than four UTPs. 
The comparison across the five study regions shows that the share of farmers with at 
least one UTP varies between 95% in Bayern and 100% in Asturias (Table 23). Asturias, 
Galicia, Normandie and Bayern have greater shares of farmers reporting two or more 
UTPs than Podlaskie or Asturias. 
48 
Table 23. Occurrence of UTPs in 2016 (% of respondents with a written 
contract) 
 
Galicia Asturias Normandie Bayern Podlaskie Total 
At least 1 UTP 98.5 100.0 99.6 94.6 97.7 97.7 
At least 2 UTPs 69.1 54.0 63.9 59.5 29.6 54.2 
At least 3 UTPs 40.6 28.0 35.2 31.0 15.7 30.2 
At least 4 UTPs 24.4 12.2 25.2 21.9 7.2 18.5 
At least 5 UTPs 13.5 6.3 19.8 16.9 4.0 12.0 
At least 6 UTPs 9.3 6.3 16.0 14.4 1.9 8.9 
At least 7 or more UTPs 6.9 2.9 12.0 10.2 1.2 6.4 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data. 
 
Table 24 compares the incidence of UTPs among members and non-members of 
cooperative or producer organizations. The results show no statistically significant 
difference in the occurrence of UTPs between members and non-members. 
Table 24. Occurrence of UTPs and farmers’ membership of 
cooperative/producer organizations in 2016 (% of respondents with a written 
contract) 
Members  Non-members 
At least 1 UTP 
97.5 98.3 
At least 2 UTPs 53.7 55.1 
At least 3 UTPs 30.6 29.2 
At least 4 UTPs 19.0 17.6 
At least 5 UTPs 11.9 12.2 
At least 6 UTPs 8.9 8.8 
At least 7 or more UTPs 
6.3 6.7 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on survey data 
 
6.4 Relationship between unfair trading practices and contract 
completeness 
In this section, we correlate the (maximum) number of UTPs per farm (from a total of 
17) and contract completeness. The number of UTPs per farm is a simple count of the 
different UTPs reported by farmers at all stages of contract development. The contract 
completeness measure is the number of elements defined in the contract from the list 
shown in Table 19. The relationship between the number of UTPs per farm and contract 
completeness is plotted in Figure 19. As the figure shows (x-axis), the maximum number 
of UTPs per farm does not exceed eight. The sizes of the circles in the figure indicate the 
frequency of the occurrence of a particular combination of number of UTPs per farm and 
degree of contract completeness. For example, the frequency of farms facing two UTPs 
and having five elements defined in the contract is greater than the frequency of farms 
facing four UTPs and having five elements set in the contract. 
Although there appears to be no strong relationship between the occurrence of UTPs and 
contract completeness, in general, simple contracts tend to be associated with a lower 
frequency of UTPs, whereas a higher frequency of UTPs tends to be linked with more 
complex contracts. This positive correlation between the occurrence of UTPs and contract 
completeness is indicated by the red dotted line in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19. The relationship between the incidence of UTPs and contract 
completeness 
 
  
Source: Authors’ calculation based on survey data. 
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7. Conclusions and limitations 
The organization and structure of food supply chains are characterized by complex 
interactions, with increased vertical coordination among actors operating in the chain. At 
the same time, food supply chains have witnessed increased moves towards 
concentration in input supply, processing and retail sectors. The growth of vertically 
integrated markets in food supply chains provides an opportunity for firms with 
bargaining power to impose their influence on weaker players, such as farmers, by 
adopting UTPs. There are also other factors that may lead to the occurrence of UTPs, 
such as the switching costs of changing trading party, asymmetric information, 
incompleteness of contracts and asymmetric costs of contract enforcement. UTPs may 
have various adverse impacts on the functioning of the EU food supply chain in general 
and may negatively affect the farming sector in particular (e.g. in terms of investments, 
farm entry and exit, market uncertainty, income distribution along the food supply chain, 
lower quality of food products on the market). Despite this, the actual impact of UTPs on 
the farming sector is still not fully understood; there are few empirical studies available 
in the literature investigating the incidence of UTPs in the farming sector. 
This report attempts to shed some light on this issue by analysing the incidence of UTPs 
in the dairy sector in selected EU regions. The analyses in this report are based on a 
survey conducted in five EU regions in 2017: Bayern (Germany), Normandie (France), 
Podlaskie (Poland), and Galicia and Asturias (Spain). The survey allows us to examine 
the incidence of UTPs, as reported by dairy farmers, in the contract content and across 
the various phases of contract development. 
The key characteristics of the surveyed farms indicate that most farms are managed by 
men (76% of all surveyed farms) and the average age of the head of the farm is 
47 years. Most heads of farms have at least secondary education in Bayern, Normandie 
and Podlaskie, whereas in the two Spanish regions the majority have only primary 
education. The surveyed dairy farms predominantly rely on unpaid family labour (83% of 
surveyed farmers). The surveyed farms usually rent the land they use, except in 
Podlaskie, where more than 70% of the sampled farmers own the land they use. In all of 
the other regions, more than 80% of land is rented. 
In the five studied regions, the production of cow’s milk follows the same general upward 
trend experienced at MS level. On average, the average milk price received by surveyed 
farmers had decreased in all regions in 2016 compared with 10 years ago, with the 
exception of Podlaskie, where the milk price received by the surveyed farmers had 
increased during this period. 
The type of buyer to which the surveyed farmers deliver their milk is heterogeneous 
across the five regions. In Galicia, Normandie, Bayern and Asturias, most surveyed 
farmers (more than 50%) deliver the milk to processing companies. In Podlaskie, the 
majority of farmers (62%) deliver to collecting or processing cooperatives. Collecting or 
processing cooperatives are also important buyers in Bayern and Normandie (for arround 
25% of surveyed farmers), while collective cooperative are the second most important 
buyers in Asturias (33%). The concentration of buyers is relatively high in Podlaskie, 
Normandie and especially Asturias, where the majority of surveyed farmers (50% or 
more) deliver their milk to two buyers. Bayern and Galicia have a less concentrated 
market structure (60 different buyers or more), with two main buyers purchasing milk 
from 15% and 26% of the surveyed farmers, respectively. 
The majority of farmers tend to be located relatively far (more than 50 km distance) 
from their main buyer in Galicia and Normandie compared with farmers in the other three 
studied regions, who are usually located between 10 and 50 km away. With the 
exception of farmers in Galicia, more than half of the surveyed farmers declared having a 
business relationship with their main milk buyer that had lasted more than 20 years. In 
general, the surveyed farmers had no intention of changing their main buyer; only 
around 24% had considered it. The main reasons for maintaining the relationship with 
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their main buyer were price level, price stability, constancy of milk collection and an 
assurance that all the milk would be collected. 
Altogether, the majority of surveyed farms have a written contract with the main buyer, 
either as an individual contract (55%) or through a cooperative or producer organization 
(26%), except in Asturias, where many farmers have informal contractual arrangements. 
The average duration of a contract varies from 9 months in Asturias and Galicia to 
58 months in Normandie. In all five regions, we observed that, on average, contracts 
explicitly specify around five different milk delivery terms. The most common terms are 
milk quality testing, duration of contract, milk price, timing of payments and premiums 
for higher milk quality. Milk prices are usually set in the contract based on a predefined 
formula. The most common parameter for price setting in the contract among surveyed 
farmers is protein content, followed by fat content, somatic cells and bacteria. The 
quality testing of milk deliveries as specified in the contract is done mainly by buyers in 
Podlaskie and in the two Spanish regions, whereas in Normandie and Bayern this testing 
is usually carried out by a third party. 
The results show that the surveyed farmers usually do not negotiate their contract with 
the main buyer. The most common reasons for not negotiating on contractual 
arrangements, as reported by farmers, are because they were determined by market 
standards or because they were imposed by the buyer. The share of farmers with a 
written contract who negotiated the contract with the main buyer is 31% of all surveyed 
farmers; the figure varies between around 15% in Podlaskie and 43% in Bayern and 
Galicia. In Asturias, Galicia, Normandie and Podlaskie, the majority of surveyed farmers 
who negotiate their contracts usually do it by themselves, whereas in Bayern they do this 
through a cooperative or producer organization. Furthermore, not all terms in the 
contract are negotiated. The most commonly negotiated terms are milk price, contract 
duration, premiums for higher milk quality and timing of payments. Other contract terms 
are not usually negotiated, although they are included in the contract. 
The results show that the incidence of UTPs is quite significant. In total, the surveyed 
dairy farmers reported 17 different UTPs. Overall, 98% of surveyed farmers reported at 
least one UTP and 54% reported at least two UTPs. The comparison across the five study 
regions shows that the share of farmers with at least one UTP varies between 95% in 
Bayern and 100% in Asturias. These results are largely in line with the literature findings. 
Although there is limited literature in the field, the available studies also find a high 
incidence of UTPs. For example, Copa-Cogeca (2013a, 2013b) found that around 94% of 
surveyed farms were affected by at least one UTP. Similarly, the CIAA-AIM (2011) study 
of the processing and retail sectors found that 96% of surveyed companies were exposed 
to UTPs. 
The largest share of UTPs was found in the contract content, with 96% of surveyed 
farmers with a written contract reporting at least one UTP. The incidence of UTPs during 
contract execution and after contract finalization was relatively low. Only around 9% of 
surveyed farmers with a written contract reported at least one UTP during these phases. 
The most common UTPs in the contract content are “no safeguard defined if the buyer 
fails to fulfil the contract” followed by “price is set unilaterally by the buyer”, “dairy-
specific investment required” and “buyer can refuse or adjust milk delivery conditions”. 
The “fear factor” represents the most common UTP during contract execution and after 
contract finalization, followed by buyers unilaterally changing prices and the required 
quality of milk deliveries. 
Our results suggest that there is some evidence of a positive correlation between the 
incidence of UTPs and contract completeness. That is, simple contracts tend to be 
associated with a lower frequency of UTPs, whereas a higher frequency of UTPs tends to 
be linked with more complex contracts. 
When drawing conclusions, one needs to be aware that our findings obviously reflect the 
limitations of the approach taken in the report. First, the report covers UTPs reported by 
dairy farmers and it does not cover other segments of the dairy supply chain. A second 
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potential caveat to our analysis is that the results cannot be extrapolated to all sectors or 
to the whole EU; they are valid only for the dairy sector and for the five regions covered 
in the report. Third, because of the complex nature of measuring the actual presence of 
UTPs, other indirect indicators may suggest the presence of UTPs that were not classified 
as UTPs but are described in the report. For example, this might include the non-
negotiation of contract terms. Although the non-negotiation of contract terms does not 
directly imply UTPs, it might suggest their occurrence. Given that negotiation is a 
common way for farms to receive better contract terms, non-engagement in negotiations 
implies that farmers are not able to alter the conditions obtained because the contract 
terms offered by the buyer are fixed (“take it or leave it”) or because farmers perceive 
the net gains that can be achieved by negotiation as small (e.g. because they have 
inferior bargaining power), thus potentially resulting in unfair contract terms for farmers. 
This consideration may mean that UTPs are underestimated. Finally, the report analyses 
UTPs only in formalized contractual business relationships (written contracts) between 
dairy farmers and buyers, and does not cover UTPs in informal business relationships. 
Future research should analyse each of these limitations of the approach to test the 
robustness of the results and to provide a complete picture of the incidence of UTPs 
along the EU food supply chain. 
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